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The international community’s inability to protect the rights of civilians during the horrendous 
atrocities of the 20th century acknowledged the vulnerable position of civilians in the midst of an 
armed conflict. In the conduct towards respect of the rights of civilians, the two international 
norms of protection, namely Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Protection of Civilians (POC) 
have emerged. These two concepts demonstrate the view on respect of human rights through both 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. This research concerns the 
extraterritorial responsibility to protect civilians in a situation of armed conflict, where both R2P 
and POC are essential norms and likewise, both norms have contributed to the increased 
responsibility for human rights. 
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sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility. International intervention is stated to be 
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protect civilians. The extraterritorial responsibility to protect civilians is founded on the 
humanitarian principle to protect the most vulnerable and on jurisdiction as responsibility, as 
states bear an obligation to ensure protection of human rights within their jurisdiction. Contrary 
to the principle of non-intervention, extraterritorial R2P and POC rely upon the universal 
commitment to protect and on the view that sovereignty equals to responsibility 
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specific area, be it nationals or non-nationals. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
This chapter presents and discusses the research questions of this thesis. Firstly, it discusses the 
background to the research, followed by a presentation of the research questions. Thirdly, this 
chapter discusses the methods and materials used in this thesis, concluding with a presentation 
of the composition of the thesis. 
 
Atrocities of the 20th century contributed to acknowledge the vulnerable position of civilians in 
the midst of an armed conflict, violations characterised by systematic targeting of civilians 
causing suffering for civilian population, as seen in the Second World War (WWII), the 
Rwandan Genocide, Srebrenica, Liberia, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Darfur to 
name a few.1 The list of examples could be made quite so extensive, as maltreatment of the 
rights of civilians is an ongoing international problem of human rights. Genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity are only some of the atrocities marked by the 
“profound failure of individual States to live up to their most basic and compelling 
responsibilities”,2 namely, to care for their own and protect the individual within the state.  
 
The United Nations (UN) was established after WWII in 1945, with the main purpose and aim 
to maintain and protect world peace and security, even so, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
specifically prohibits the use of force in order to initiate an armed conflict.3 A wish to avoid 
walking down the same path of violence and war again can also be found in the Preamble of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): ”(…) disregard and contempt for human 
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind”.4 As 
well as that, the atrocities of the 20th century made the international community aware of the 
problematics in times of war and led to action aimed at ameliorating the situation of civilians.5 
                                               
1 International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, ICRC, 31IC/11/5.1.2, 
2011, p. 5. 
2 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, UN doc. A/63/677, 
paragraph 5. 
3 Article 2(4), Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
4 Preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
5 Atrocities and effect on civilians, as seen in the Preamble, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
1998: “Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable 
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity, Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, 
security and well-being of the world” (emphasis added by the author). 
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However, international law and the international community, although it could be said to have 
the means to protect, failed to provide the most “basic human security for those subjected to 
the most horrendous of atrocities”.6 Skogly argues that, “state responsibility is not commonly 
invoked in situations where the actions of one state breach or threaten the human rights of 
individuals in another state”.7 Protecting the rights of civilians during armed conflict is a core 
principle under international humanitarian law (IHL), and hence, also under public international 
law (PIL) which makes it a vital topic of PIL. According to Milanovic “[h]uman rights are, after 
all, supposed to be universal” and consequently, it should be irrelevant whether a violation has 
taken place inside the territory or outside the territory of a state.8 This, however, is rarely the 
case, as violations committed outside the territory of a state most often become matters of treaty 
interpretation.9 This thesis concentrates on the responsibility of a state to extraterritorially 
protect its unarmed population in a situation of armed conflict. 
 
The last century marked a new era for humanity in several ways, development and improved 
conditions for life marked all fields of society. Remarkable progress was made in most fields 
of life, by way of example, improved nutrition, food processing and food storage; medicines, 
vaccinations, health care and hygiene; construction methods and transport; radio, television and 
the internet; education and literacy rates; weapons and war machinery; respect of human rights 
and peace.10 Here it is to be noted, there is still much to be done, but most fields of life have 
developed and improved for the better during the last 20 years.11 Keeping the aforementioned 
in mind, what were the most shocking events of the last century? The persecution of Jews and 
the Holocaust during the WWII, the inconsiderate exploitation of African colonies, the 
Rwandan genocide and rape as a method of genocide,12 the systematic mass killings of 
Srebrenica, the killing fields of Cambodia and so forth. These and multiple other horrendous 
mass atrocity crimes and armed conflicts across the globe that caused the death of millions of 
innocent people during the last century.13 The tragic events of the 20th century made the UN 
                                               
6 Stockburger, “The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Customary International Law, an Emerging Legal Norm 
or Just Wishful Thinking?”, Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2010, Vol. 5, p. 365. 
7 Skogly, “Extraterritoriality: universal human rights without universal obligations?” in Joseph and McBeth (eds.), 
2011, p. 86. 
8 Milanovic, 2011, p. 2. 
9 Ibid., p. 2. 
10 Global Development Statistics, available at www.gapminder.org 
11 Ibid.  
12 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Rape: Weapon of War”, available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/rapeweaponwar.aspx 
13 Glover, 1996, p. 2. 
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together with world leaders question “whether the United Nations and other international 
institutions should be exclusively focused on the security of States without regard to the safety 
of the people within them” and,14 is it possible that sovereignty could “be misused as a shield 
behind which mass violence could be inflicted on populations with impunity?”.15 One of the 
major difficulties in contemporary armed conflicts is the need to protect civilians and civilian 
objects, like homes, schools and hospitals.16 
 
In the 21st century, the world is moving towards international peace.17 Historically, it is the 
most peaceful time in history thus far, although that is only part of the truth as the nature of 
armed conflicts has changed and non-international armed conflict (NIAC) or intra-state 
conflicts and civil wars are now the dominating form of conflict.18 The shift from international 
armed conflict (IAC) or inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts has come at the cost of 
civilians, as civilians undoubtedly are targeted in intra-state conflicts.19 Although the 21st 
century can be said to be peaceful, armed conflicts do occur and cause horrible outcomes 
regarding civilian population and civilian property.20 Even so, the aftermaths of an armed 
conflict are serious. It takes time to rebuild infrastructure, to move on and pass trauma, 
eventually reaching a functioning and inclusive society. That is to say, to move from war and 
chaos to peace and respect of human rights. Darfur, Libya and Myanmar are to be mentioned 
as these are only some of the most recent conflicts where extraterritorial protection of civilians 
(POC) has been neglected.21 Stockburger stated in his article that discusses responsibility to 
protect (R2P) that “[h]umankind is well versed in the art of atrocity. The law, unfortunately, as 
an institution created to govern the brutality of human action is also well versed in the art of 
inaction”.22 The remarked change in the nature of conflicts since the latter half of the 20th 
century from inter-state to intra-state has led to a distinct change in who bears the R2P, the 
                                               
14 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, UN doc. 
A/63/677, paragraph 5. 
15 Ibid., paragraph 5. 
16 Murphy, “Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law 2012, Vol. 
17, No. 3, pp. 373-402. 
17 Global Development Statistics, available at www.gapminder.org 
18 Orchard, "The Perils of Humanitarianism: Refugee and IDP Protection in Situations of Regime-Induced 
Displacement", Refugee Survey Quarterly 2010, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 38. 
19 Ibid., pp. 38-41. 
20 See e.g. the situation in Myanmar, Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-finding 
mission on Myanmar, A/HRC/39/64, 12 September 2018.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Stockburger, “The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Customary International Law, an Emerging Legal Norm 
or Just Wishful Thinking?”, Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2010, Vol. 5, p. 365. 
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responsibility has to some degree shifted from the state to humanitarian organisations and the 
like.23 Supposedly that is a logical outcome when a state targets its own people, then the same 
government also lacks the interest or will, to protect its own people and so the responsibility is 
placed on the international community instead.24 At an international level this leads to the fact 
that “many of these victims receive inadequate (or no) protection”, in this example ‘victims’ 
comprehends the civilian population.25  
 
POC can be maintained and developed through different methods and one can say that, though 
an aspiration to protect civilian population has been common among state practice through 
customary international law (CIL) and IHL, still this can tend to be forgotten when a state itself 
is involved in an actual situation of armed conflict.26 CIL is of utmost importance in 
contemporary armed conflicts as it fills the gaps that are not filled by treaty law. Coherence is 
lacking when discussing state practice and reality, the actions of a state then are what indicates 
whether the state in question actually does respect the principle of civilian protection or not.27 
There is, however, a gap between formulated and established state aspirations for conduct of 
actions during armed conflict and actual conduct of actions during armed conflict, this gap 
being of a surprisingly great extent in contemporary armed conflicts,28 especially regarding that 
a majority of states are parties to the most relevant conventions and treaties regulating IHL. 
POC in armed conflict is thus accepted as established state practice, a norm of CIL and it is 
regulated by several international treaties.29 
 
                                               
23 Orchard, "The Perils of Humanitarianism: Refugee and IDP Protection in Situations of Regime-Induced 
Displacement", Refugee Survey Quarterly 2010, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 38-41. 
24 Ibid., p. 41. 
25 Ibid., p. 41. 
26 Nishimura, “The Principle of Civilian Protection and Contemporary Warfare” in Hensel (ed.), 2005, p. 106. 
27 Ibid., pp. 105–106. 
28 Ibid., p. 106. 
29 Valentino, Huth and Croco, “Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians 
in Times of War”, World Politics, 2006, Vol. 58, No. 3, p. 339 and p. 341.  
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For a practice to become CIL, an “extensive and virtually uniform” and “settled practice”,30 
that has acquired “evidence of a general practice accepted as law”,31 should be distinguished. 
Furthermore, the practice should be supported by an international opinion that the practice is 
legally binding, opinio juris, the belief that a norm is accepted as law.32 Once practice meets 
these requirements, it can be said to be considered as a rule of CIL that is binding all states.33  
However, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)  
“shows that contrary practice that appears at first sight to undermine the uniformity of the practice 
concerned does not prevent the formation of a rule of customary international law as long as this 
contrary practice is condemned by other states or denied by the government itself.”34  
 
All parties to an armed conflict are responsible for protecting civilians, by seeking to minimize 
the harm caused to civilians and civilian objects.35 Regardless of this, civilian protection is 
neither fully implemented in practice nor is it self-evident in a situation of armed conflict.36 The 
principle of POC during armed conflict then composes part of CIL, and has been seen as part 
of CIL since the beginning of the 20th century.37 The obligation to spare the civilian population 
from unnecessary suffering and damage to civilian objects was primarily stated in Article 23 of 
the Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (HCIV)38 and in Article 25 of the 
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
                                               
30North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, pp. 43-44: “Although the passage of only a short 
period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law 
on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within 
the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially 
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;- and should 
moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is 
involved.” 
31 Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945. 
32 Ryngaert, 2015, p. 181. 
33 Stockburger, “The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Customary International Law, an Emerging Legal Norm 
or Just Wishful Thinking?”, Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2010, Vol. 5, p. 389. 
34 Henckaerts, “Assessing the Laws and Customs of War: The Publication of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law”, Human Rights Brief 2006, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 9. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, paragraph 186: ”The 
Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in 
absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems 
it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules”. 
35 Articles 48 and 57, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1977. 
36 Valentino, Huth and Croco, “Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians 
in Times of War”, World Politics, 2006, Vol. 58, No. 3, p. 341. 
37 Nishimura, “The Principle of Civilian Protection and Contemporary Warfare” in Hensel (ed.), 2005, p. 107. 
38 Article 23, Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907. 
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Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (HCII)39 already in the early 
beginning of the 20th century. Article 22 as well as Article 24 of the 1923 Rules concerning the 
Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare also at an early stage stated 
the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and attacks directed against civilians are prohibited.40 
 
States do have both a right and a duty to protect; to protect its nationals, but also any other 
person present within the borders of a state.41 States also have a responsibility to protect its own 
nationals when a national is under the jurisdiction of a foreign state, and hence not situated 
within the territory of national protection. Milanovic has stated that application of human rights 
treaties extraterritorially “must have a real-world impact. Otherwise […] it would be worse 
than useless” and it would result in violations going through a degeneration and making 
extraterritorial state-led acts against individuals lawful by twisted means.42 This principle of 
extra-territorial protection of nationals becomes interesting in a situation of armed conflict, 
when regarding protection of civilians. Accordingly, states bear the responsibility to protect 
their nationals, especially vulnerable and disadvantaged groups of their population, also 
extraterritorially. There are different ways for defining who is a vulnerable person or what 
consists a vulnerable group, however, what is generally acknowledged in the discussion of 
vulnerability is the recognition that there is a need to protect the rights of vulnerable people.43 
The Icelandic Human Rights Centre has listed 13 groups that can be seen as especially 
vulnerable and disadvantaged and therefore needing special protection: 1) women and girls; 2) 
children; 3) refugees; 4) internally displaced persons; 5) stateless persons; 6) national 
minorities; 7) indigenous peoples; 8) migrant workers; 9) disabled persons; 10) elderly persons; 
11) HIV positive persons and AIDS victims; 12) Roma/ Gypsies/ Sinti; and 13) lesbian, gay 
and transgender people.44 There are obviously further definitions and categorisations as this list 
is not all-embracing, but the Icelandic Human Rights Centre’s list can be used as a general 
                                               
39 Article 25, Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1899. 
40 Articles 22 and 24, Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, 
1923. 
41 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001. 
42 Milanovic, 2011, p. 113. 
43 Chapman and Carbonetti, “Human Rights Protection for Vulnerable and Disadvantaged Groups: The 
Contributions of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 2011, 
Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 682. 
44 Icelandic Human Rights Centre, “The Human Rights Protection of Vulnerable Groups”, 2009, available at 
http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora/the-human-
rights-protection-of-vulnerable-groups  
Victoria Åkermarck 
 
 7 
guiding principle for vulnerable groups. Consequently, just like any other civilian during an 
armed conflict, these distinguished vulnerable and disadvantaged groups need protection. As 
the UDHR pledges states to promote “universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”,45 then, naturally, R2P and POC ought to be respected at all times and 
without distinction to territory.46 
 
1.2. Research Questions 
The research questions this thesis aims to answer are presented in this section. The field of 
international law that covers extraterritorial protection is wide, and all aspects of extraterritorial 
protection is therefore impossible to cover in this thesis. However, the following aspects of 
extraterritorial protection will be covered by this research. Firstly, when an individual is situated 
in the territory, admittedly within the jurisdiction of another state and an armed conflict occurs, 
whose responsibility is it to protect this civilian? What is the legal foundation of R2P, and how 
about POC, what does this international norm of protection entail? Secondly, what duties do 
states have to protect their national(s) in a situation of armed conflict when the civilian is 
situated under the jurisdiction of a foreign state? Then, on the one hand, what rights do states 
possess to protect their national(s) in a situation of armed conflict when the civilian is situated 
under the jurisdiction of a foreign state? Why do states have this right to protect their nationals 
extraterritorially in a situation of armed conflict? How can states practice this right to protect 
their nationals and are there situations when states can be forced to protect their nationals abroad 
during wartime? And what jurisdictional foundation is there for states’ responsibility to 
extraterritorially protect civilians in a situation of armed conflict? and what is the legal ground 
for this extraterritorial responsibility? Finally, on the other hand, is there any situation when 
states are legitimately prohibited from protecting their nationals abroad in a situation of armed 
conflict? 
 
Humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations are not included in the research of 
this thesis, but the research is to concentrate on activity to protect civilians that is bound to the 
state. More often than not, the activity to protect civilians by humanitarian agencies is limited, 
                                               
45 Preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
46 Milanovic, 2011, p. 56. 
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as humanitarian agencies often lack political authority, military force and legal mandate to 
protect civilians in an effective manner.47 
 
1.3. Method and Materials 
This thesis is to follow the legal doctrinal method and to analyse the current existing law 
provided through human rights treaties, relevant case law and the practice around the extant 
legal instruments regarding extraterritorial protection of civilians, which can assist in the 
advancement of the implementation of these basic rights of civilians. In order to conduct the 
research of this thesis, PIL sources defined in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ have been 
used, that is: international conventions, international custom, general principles of law and 
doctrine.48 The subject of the thesis is presented through literature concerning extraterritorial 
R2P and POC, the research questions are discussed through these principles of CIL, as well as 
decisions from both international and domestic courts to demonstrate the interpretation of 
norms. The legal discussion is reflected through a variety of documents from the UN, as well 
as monographs and articles written by experts of PIL. Sources are discussed, examined and 
applied with special focus on extraterritorial responsibility to protect civilians. Conclusions are 
made through a critical review of existing legal grounds, and previous research on 
extraterritorial protection of civilians will be the background for this thesis. 
 
This thesis presents the essential instruments from PIL for this research, that are: the four 
Geneva Conventions from 12 August 1949 [Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GCI), Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea (GCII), Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GCIII) and 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GCIV)] together 
with their 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (API) and Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
                                               
47 Orchard, "The Perils of Humanitarianism: Refugee and IDP Protection in Situations of Regime-Induced 
Displacement", Refugee Survey Quarterly 2010, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 75. 
48 Article 38(1), Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 
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Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (APII).49 These conventions constituting the 
very core of IHL and forming the basis for this thesis together with the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), the 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Charter of the United Nations. R2P is to a large extent 
discussed through The Responsibility to Protect report by the International Commission of 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).50 This study will be significant as it will form an 
overview of available literature, legislation and case law and provide an in-depth analysis in 
the area of extraterritorial R2P and POC. However, it is evidently impossible to provide a 
completely clear synopsis of the implementation of extraterritorial protection of civilians across 
the international community, as to some extent it is impossible to gain information regarding 
state practice and customary principles. 
 
1.4. Composition and Chapters  
By way of introduction, this thesis commences by presenting the background to the research 
questions of the thesis and then moves on to present and analyse R2P and POC in Chapter 2. 
Followed by Chapter 3 regarding the principles of extraterritorial protection of civilians, that 
is, jurisdiction. Chapter 3 will first discuss the concept of territoriality and the concept of 
extraterritoriality, then it will advance to discuss extraterritorial jurisdiction. Chapter 3.2.1. will 
start with a discussion of jurisdiction in a general manner and it will then move on to more 
specific aspects of jurisdiction in an extraterritorial setting, followed by a discussion on 
jurisdiction of R2P and POC. Chapter 4 focuses on extraterritorial protection of civilians, by 
looking at extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, state responsibility and effective 
control. Finally, in Chapter 5, this thesis will end by a concluding discussion regarding 
extraterritorial responsibility to protect civilians within the findings of the research. 
 
                                               
49 These major IHL treaties protect wounded and sick combatants (GCI); shipwrecked combatants (GCII); 
prisoners of war (GCIII); civilians and those in occupied territories (GCIV); broadened protection of civilians and 
limits the means and methods of war and (API); civilians and civilian objects in non-international armed conflicts 
(APII). 
50 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001. 
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It is to be noted that there are variations in terminology, when speaking of extraterritoriality, 
thus both extra-territoriality and extraterritoriality will be used in this thesis. Likewise, the terms 
protection of civilian and protection of civilians are used in a synonymous manner. 
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2. International Norms of Protection 
2.1. Responsibility to Protect 
2.1.1. Background 
This chapter will discuss the two norms of international law, that is R2P and POC. The chapter 
firstly discusses and presents R2P, its legal background and framework, this is followed by a 
discussion concerning the three pillars of R2P. POC is presented through a similar manner, 
firstly, demonstrating the background and legal framework of the norm, then proceeding to the 
different forms of POC. The chapter is concluded by analysing the legal foundation of civilians 
and civilian objects according to IHL, in order to demonstrate the law that protection of civilians 
is based on and what it consists of. For the research of this thesis, namely, extraterritorial 
responsibility to protect civilians in a situation of armed conflict, a discussion on R2P and POC 
is vital, as it demonstrates the international norms that constitutes part of the basis of 
extraterritorial responsibility to protect civilians. 
 
States have the primary obligation to care for their nationals and other persons present in their 
jurisdiction through both positive and negative state obligations. The state is to ensure that 
rights of individuals, as recognised by law, “are respected, protected, fulfilled and when 
necessary, enforced” within the jurisdiction.51 Positive state obligations denote a state’s 
obligation to actively secure the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. Obligations to ensure 
human rights of persons within the jurisdiction, that is, positive state obligations, can according 
to Milanovic be translated into the practice of preventing “violations committed by third states, 
private individuals or non-state groups”.52 This comprehends activity to facilitate the enjoyment 
of a right. Activity to promote the enjoyment of human rights can be both judicial and 
practical;53 it can be actions to provide regulatory framework and to take preventive operational 
                                               
51 “Positive and negative obligations of the State”, The Doha Declaration: Promoting a Culture of Lawfulness, 
2019, available at: https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/tip-and-som/module-2/key-issues/positive-and-negative-
obligations-of-the-state.html 
52 Milanovic, 2011, p. 46. 
53 “Positive and negative obligations of the State”, The Doha Declaration: Promoting a Culture of Lawfulness, 
2019, available at: https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/tip-and-som/module-2/key-issues/positive-and-negative-
obligations-of-the-state.html 
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measures.54 In order for a state to fulfil its positive state obligations, “a state needs actual or 
effective control over a territory or a population”.55 
 
Negative state obligations comprehends a duty to “refrain from action that would hinder human 
rights”.56 Compared to positive state obligations, in order to violate negative state obligations, 
“a state needs little by way of means”.57 When a state fails to fulfil its state obligations, then 
legal procedures might be lodged against that state and the international community might be 
made the one to bear the responsibility of fulfilling the state obligations neglected by the 
national state. 
 
Throughout history, civilians have been significantly affected by armed conflicts; both 
regarding damage to civilian objects and the number of civilian lives lost in armed conflicts.58 
On the one hand, since long there has been a humanitarian tendency and an aspiration to spare 
civilian population from the atrocities of war,59 namely formally stated for the first time in the 
1868 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight (St Petersburg Declaration).60 In the St Petersburg Declaration, it is stated 
”the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to 
weaken the military forces of the enemy”,61 hence the main objective of a party to any armed 
conflict is not to cause the greatest possible damage to the counterparts, e.g. any kind of 
severe or widespread damage that will most probably affect the civilian population in several 
ways; but to concentrate on military objectives and the like of the enemy. On the other hand, 
in CIL, there has long been a humanitarian point of view regarding civilians in armed 
conflicts, military leaders expressing humanitarian wishes in order to spare civilian 
                                               
54 Guide on Article 2 of the Convention – Right to Life, Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2019, 
p. 8/49. 
55 Milanovic, 2011, p. 18. 
56 “Positive and negative obligations of the State”, The Doha Declaration: Promoting a Culture of Lawfulness, 
2019, available at: https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/tip-and-som/module-2/key-issues/positive-and-negative-
obligations-of-the-state.html 
57 Milanovic, 2011, p. 18. 
58 Valentino, Huth and Croco, “Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians 
in Times of War”, World Politics, 2006, Vol. 58, No. 3, p. 339. 
59 Ibid., p. 339. 
60 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, 
1868. 
61 Ibid. 
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populations from unnecessary damage and sufferings,62 this humanitarian wish is today 
formally expressed by the doctrine of R2P.63 Whereas R2P is mainly an obligation for states, 
POC is binding also for actors that are non-state actors.64 
 
The principle of R2P emerged only recently, in 2001, and the principle originates from 
situations “of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states” to intervene and take action, especially 
military action, in another state with the purpose of protecting vulnerable people at risk in that 
other state.65 After the atrocities during the last decade of the 20th century, it became clear for 
the international community that non-interference in the face of atrocity crimes was no longer 
acceptable.66 Gross human rights violations, sovereign integrity and the principle of non-
interference posed the international community before a global dilemma regarding intervention 
for human protection purposes.67 What makes R2P tricky still, is the fact that international help 
and intervention is nothing self-evident nor is it anything that can be guaranteed to populations 
at risk, because who would bear the main responsibility to co-ordinate international intervention 
and on what grounds would the need for intervention be based? The basis of the doctrine is to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and 
from their incitement.68  
                                               
62 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005, pp. 3-8, Rule 1: “The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish 
between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed 
against civilians”. 
63 See Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001 and Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, UN doc. 
A/63/677. 
64 Popovski, “The Concepts of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians: ‘Sisters, but not Twins’”, 
Security Challenges 2011, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 5. 
65 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, p. vii. 
66 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 
S/1999/957, 8 September 1999. 
67 Durham and Wynn-Pope, “The relationship between international humanitarian law and responsibility to 
protect: From Solferino to Srebrenica” in Francis, Popovski and Sampford (eds.), 2012, p. 178. 
68 World Summit Outcome Document, 24 October 2005, UN doc. A/RES/60/1, paragraphs 138 and 139. 
Paragraph 138:”Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including 
their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance 
with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.” Paragraph 139:”The 
international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance 
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing 
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress 
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International intervention can be controversial in many aspects, even the existence of 
international intervention or the lack of intervention can at times cause controversy in the 
international community.69 R2P or the duty to protect is a tool for assuring that states “actually 
do exercise jurisdiction when it would be in the interest of the international community”.70 
Notably, the doctrine implies above all a “responsibility to react” to situations in serious need 
of humanitarian help and human protection,71 especially when a state itself is unwilling or 
unable to restore the situation at hand.72 In addition to the responsibility to react, the doctrine 
implies a “responsibility to prevent”,73 and a “responsibility to rebuild”.74 It can be justified to 
say states at times do have a certain responsibility and not only a responsibility, but a duty to 
exercise jurisdiction, either as a responsibility or duty to protect other states or even 
fundamental values of the whole international community.75 The doctrine of R2P consequently 
affirms the suggestion “that the international community has a duty to intervene, to protect”.76 
To some extent, extraterritorial human rights obligations, like R2P, are seen as international 
obligations.77 The former United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan in his report 
‘We the Peoples’ – the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century posed the following 
question to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA): 
 if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
offend every precept of our common humanity?.78 
 
                                               
the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the 
principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, 
to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.” 
69 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, p. vii. 
70 Ryngaert, 2015, p. 161 (emphasis original). 
71 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, paragraph 4.1. 
72 Ibid., paragraph 4.1. 
73 Ibid., paragraphs 3.1-3.5. 
74 Ibid., paragraphs 5.1-5.2. 
75 Ryngaert, 2015, p. 161. 
76 Orchard, "The Perils of Humanitarianism: Refugee and IDP Protection in Situations of Regime-Induced 
Displacement", Refugee Survey Quarterly 2010, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 60. 
77 Skogly, “Extraterritoriality: universal human rights without universal obligations?” in Joseph and McBeth (eds.), 
2011, pp. 73-74. 
78 Report of the UN Secretary-General, ‘We the Peoples’- the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century , 30 
March 2000, Press Release No.  UNIS/SG/2529, p. 48. 
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R2P is an answer to this challenge.79 The doctrine of R2P is a response to the inaction and 
paralysation that marked the international community, especially during the second half of the 
20th century; an inaction that has facilitated acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.80 As armed conflicts have made the shift from inter-state to intra-state, so 
also humanitarian intervention has developed. Focus has shifted from a right to intervene 
opposed to territorial integrity, to rights of individuals and the responsibility of states and the 
international community to protect these rights of individuals.81 This has led to emphasis being 
put on “human rights, primary state responsibility and international back-up” responsibility.82 
 
When discussing R2P and international intervention, the notion of right to intervene is put 
upside-down, as the international responsibility is rather to be put on global responsibility to 
protect people at risk than on the right to intervene, the perspective being angled on those in 
need of help and not on the intervening party.83 Simultaneously, the doctrine of R2P is an 
emerging norm of international law, a norm of “fundamental ethical importance” for the whole 
international community and international rights system.84  The concept of protection could be 
used to require a state (or states) to exercise jurisdiction when gross human rights violations 
like genocide; war crimes; slavery; torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment; enforced disappearance; deportation or forcible transfer of population; and 
systematic discrimination, especially when based on race or gender take place in the territory 
of a state.85 In a jurisdictional context, R2P could even be used to require states to “assume their 
responsibility to bring to justice the perpetrators of such violations”.86 To some extent R2P and 
universal jurisdiction supplement each other and work towards the same goals.87 R2P can be 
used as a motivation for requiring states to “exercise jurisdiction over internationally harmful 
activities originating” from within the territory.88  
                                               
79 Stockburger, “The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Customary International Law, an Emerging Legal Norm 
or Just Wishful Thinking?”, Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2010, Vol. 5, p. 365. 
80 Ibid., p. 365. 
81 Francis and Sampford “Introduction” in Francis, Popovski and Sampford (eds.), 2012, p. 4. 
82 Ibid., p. 4. 
83 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, Chapter 2. 
84 Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect”, Wisconsin International Law Journal 
2006, Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 704. 
85 Ryngaert, 2015, p. 162. 
86 Ibid., p. 162. 
87 See Chapter 3.2.7.in this thesis regarding Universal Jurisdiction. 
88 Ryngaert, 2015, p. 162. 
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Sovereignty and intervention are two concepts that have been much associated with R2P, which 
is demonstrated in the following two basic principles, compiled by the ICISS, where the concept 
of R2P was formulated for the first time:  
A) State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its 
people lies within the state itself. 
 
B) Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency or state 
failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. 89 
 
The concept of R2P was further affirmed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
(WSOD) and in 2006 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Resolution 1674.90 
Both sovereignty and intervention, especially military intervention, can be said to be somewhat 
controversial in this context, as there is a plethora of differing opinions whether intervention is 
justified, to what amount intervention is justified, whereas sovereignty is disturbed by 
international intervention, according to some, and protection of human rights comes prior to 
sovereignty according to others. Also, who is to decide on international intervention, duration 
of intervention and manner of intervention are opinion-dividing aspects of R2P.  
 
In the Implementing the Responsibility to Protect report from 2009, by the UNSG Ban Ki-
moon, R2P includes three “pillars” or responsibilities,91 Breakey refers to these pillars as 
elements.92 Accordingly, there are three pillars, responsibilities or elements in the core concept 
of R2P, namely: 
1) the protection responsibilities of the state or “sovereignty as responsibility”,93 
2) international assistance and capacity-building or international back-up responsibility to protect 
and 
                                               
89 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, Basic Principles A) and B), p. xi. 
90 World Summit Outcome Document, 24 October 2005, UN doc. A/RES/60/1 and UNSC Resolution 1674, 28 
April 2006, UN doc. S/RES/1674: “Reaffirming that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to 
take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of affected civilians” 
91 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, UN doc. 
A/63/677. 
92 Breakey, “The responsibility to protect: Game change and regime change”, in Francis, Popovski and Sampford 
(eds.), 2012, p. 11. 
93 Deng (ed.), 1996. 
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3) timely and decisive interventions or manner of interventions.94 
 
In sub-chapters 2.2.1. to 2.2.3., these three main elements will be discussed. Overall, in short, 
the doctrine of R2P operates on the assumption that, when and where, a state is failing or fails, 
by unwillingness or inability, to protect its population from atrocities, the remaining 
responsibility falls on the international community to protect.95 When and if, the territorial state 
would fail to assume its R2P, then other states could/should step in, in order to protect the 
interests of the civilian population and the international community.96 
 
2.1.2. Legal Framework of Responsibility to Protect 
The doctrine of R2P operates within the frames of international law, IHL and the foundation 
for human protection. Pre-existing bodies of international law such as the 1998 Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), the 1948 Genocide Convention and the 1945 
UN Charter, award R2P its authority.97 The UN and especially the UNSC bears an effective 
role in this regard, as according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter the UNSC is conferred with 
the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security.98 Articles 39, 41 and 42 
of the UN Charter further discuss this responsibility of the UNSC to maintain international 
peace and security, by ways of describing what action, especially non-military action and as a 
last resort military action, the UNSC can take when it has identified the existence of a threat to 
international peace.99 These aforementioned articles together with Article 51 of the UN Charter 
regarding self-defence, are the only articles in the UN Charter that “expressly trump the 
domestic jurisdiction restriction”.100 The mandate to maintain international peace and security 
given to the UNSC in the articles of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, indeed authorises the UNSC 
to act in order to protect civilians.101 Additionally, Article VIII of the Genocide Convention 
                                               
94 Ibid., p. 11. For more detailed information regarding the three elements of R2P, see Report of the Secretary-
General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, UN doc. A/63/677. 
95 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, UN doc. 
A/63/677. 
96 Ryngaert, 2015, p. 162. 
97 Durham and Wynn-Pope, “The relationship between international humanitarian law and responsibility to 
protect: From Solferino to Srebrenica” in Francis, Popovski and Sampford (eds.), 2012, p. 176. 
98 Article 24, Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
99 Articles 39, 41 and 42, Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
100 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, paragraph 6.4, Articles 39, 41, 42 and 51, Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
101 Chapter VII, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Breakey and Francis, “Points of Convergence and 
Divergence: Normative, Institutional and Operational Relationships between R2P and PoC”, Security Challenges 
2011, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 46. 
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provides the competent UN organs with the authority to prevent genocide.102 Article VII of the 
Genocide Convention then implies the UNSC to be the primary organ to take appropriate action 
and prevent genocide.103  
 
The UNSC is not the sole organ to undertake the maintenance of international peace and 
security, it does have the primary responsibility to maintain peace but the UNGA is also liable 
with regard to questions of peace and security as well as is the UNSG.104 Article 10 of the UN 
Charter provides the UNGA with a general responsibility scope to any question within the 
Charter of the UN, whereas Article 11 gives the UNGA a fallback responsibility to make 
recommendations, not binding decisions but recommendations, with specific regard to 
questions of maintenance of international peace and security.105 The UNSG can bring questions 
to the UNSC, when the questions may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security.106 
 
Additionally, and as mentioned previously, the primary R2P lies firstly in the hands of the 
sovereign state, secondly with domestic authorities that exercise partnership with external 
operators and only at the third place comes international organisations.107 Where a state fails to 
protect the people within its jurisdiction from atrocities, there is a responsibility deficit and the 
international community with the UNSC in a key position is to step in.108 For as long as states 
make it a priority to protect peace and its own population from atrocities by jurisdiction and 
active measures of R2P, the probability of a responsibility deficit is kept at a minimal level. 
 
                                               
102 Article XIII, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. 
103 Breakey and Francis, “Points of Convergence and Divergence: Normative, Institutional and Operational 
Relationships between R2P and PoC”, Security Challenges 2011, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 46. 
104 Articles 10, 11 and 99, Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
105 Articles 10 and 11, Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
106 Article 99, Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
107 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, paragraph 6.11. 
108 Ibid., paragraph 6.11. 
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2.2. Three Pillars of Responsibility to Protect 
2.2.1. Sovereignty as Responsibility 
Firstly, R2P lies utmost with the state.109 This first pillar of the doctrine of R2P is founded on 
the permanent responsibility of states to protect its population within its jurisdiction, meaning 
not only the relatively new concept of R2P, but also previous legal obligations derived from 
continuing and long-standing legal obligations under international law.110 Jurisdiction and 
sovereignty walk hand in hand, as jurisdiction under international law directly refers to the 
competence of a state to regulate persons situated in its territory; both its own nationals and 
foreigners, as well as natural and legal persons.111 In international law, sovereignty implies the 
legal identity of a state and the ability to make conclusive decisions within the territory of the 
state, in other words to exercise jurisdiction within its territorial borders.112 Hence, it can be 
said that “extraterritorial exercise of force inside another state infringes that state’s 
jurisdictional monopoly of force within its borders” by the concept of sovereignty,113 as 
sovereignty is most often interpreted as  implying “a right against interference or intervention 
by any foreign (or international) power”.114 “[S]overeignty is more than just a functional 
principle of international relations”, 115 sovereignty can also be a symbol for “equal worth and 
dignity”,116 a protection of unique cultural identities and national freedom.117 As well as that, 
sovereignty bears a dual responsibility of external and internal respect.118 External respect, on 
the one hand, extending to respecting the international community, as in respecting the 
sovereignty of other states.119 Internal respect, on the other hand, embracing to respect the 
                                               
109 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, Basic Principles A), p. xi, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 
January 2009, UN doc. A/63/677, p. 10. 
110 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 12 January 2009, UN doc. 
A/63/677, p. 8. 
111 Cooreman, 2017, p. 85. 
112 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, paragraph 2.7. 
113 Colangelo, ”What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, Cornell Law Review 2014, Vol. 99, No. 6, p. 1311. 
114 Jackson, “Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach To An Outdated Concept”, AJIL 2003, Vol. 97, No. 4, p. 
782. 
115 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, paragraph 1.32. 
116 Ibid., paragraph 1.32. 
117 Ibid., paragraph 1.32. 
118 Ibid., paragraph 1.35. 
119 Ibid., paragraph 1.35. 
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people within the state, e.g. respecting their dignity and basic human rights,120 as well as 
protection of safety and promotion of their citizens welfare.121 
 
The relationship between sovereignty and human rights needs to be re-evaluated in the sense 
that the view on sovereignty needs to be seen as a shift from “sovereignty as control to 
sovereignty as responsibility”.122 In other words, this contends the fact that sovereignty cannot 
be used as a pre-requisite for acts of violence within a state, sovereignty is not to be understood 
as an authority entitling to (whatever) domestic activities the state and its authorities desire, but 
on the contrary, the basis for sovereignty is the fundamental protection of peoples most 
fundamental human rights.123 Thus, sovereignty is no longer admitted as a defence for 
atrocities,124 which it did formerly, as historically, before the 20th century, state sovereignty 
implied an undeniable, domestic monopoly on the use of force.125 The protection 
responsibilities of the state includes not only protection for nationals, but protection from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity for anyone present in the 
territory, were it nationals, foreigners, residents or visitors.126 Deng has pointed out that 
sovereignty is compiled of certain international privileges and of enduring obligations towards 
one’s own people.127 Thereby meaning that, fulfilment of fundamental protection obligations 
and respect of core human rights would decrease the state’s concerns of unwelcome 
international intervention.128  
 
2.2.2. Responsibility to Protect as International Back-Up 
Secondly, international assistance and capacity-building or international back-up R2P enhances 
the commitment of the international community to support each other in meeting the obligations 
                                               
120 Ibid., paragraph 1.35. 
121 Ibid., paragraph 2.15. 
122 Ibid., paragraph 2.14. 
123 Breakey, “The responsibility to protect: Game change and regime change”, in Francis, Popovski and Sampford 
(eds.), 2012, p. 12. 
124 Ibid., p. 12. 
125 Thakur, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Between Opportunistic Humanitarianism and Value-Free 
Pragmatism”, Security Challenges 2011, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 13. 
126 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, UN doc. 
A/63/677, p. 8. 
127 Deng (ed.), 1996. 
128 Ibid. 
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of R2P.129 This second element of R2P relates to assisting a state to fulfil its primary element 
protection responsibilities, in other words, when a state is unable to fully meet its first pillar 
responsibilities, be it “because of capacity deficits or lack of territorial control”,130 then the 
international community ought to be ready to assist and support this state to meet its core 
obligations.131  
 
The co-operation intended by the principle of R2P engages various parties from international 
co-operation to regional, sub-regional, private sector and civil society mechanisms.132 Measures 
intended by the ICISS and the UN in the question of intervention are economic, political and 
judicial measures, by way of example political, diplomatic or economic sanctions; military 
intervention is only justified in “extreme cases”.133 The scope of measures of intervention 
within the framework of R2P goes from domestic to bilateral, regional and international 
measures, commencing from power-sharing agreements,134 to military force as a last resort.135 
 
2.2.3. Responsibility to Protect and Manner of Intervention 
Thirdly, when a state fails to provide protection to its citizens, then the international 
community’s responsibility is to “respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner”.136 This 
third element not only includes the responsibility to react, prevent and stop, but also the 
responsibility to follow through and rebuild.137 This way it is possible to ensure “sustainable 
reconstruction and rehabilitation” of a society demolished by large scale violations of human 
rights.138 
 
                                               
129 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, UN doc. 
A/63/677, p. 15. 
130 Ibid., p. 10. 
131 Ibid., p. 10. 
132 Ibid., p. 15. 
133 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, paragraphs 4.1. and 4.4. 
134 See Schneider, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect in Kenya and Beyond, International Crisis Group, 
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What still causes controversy among states, within the concept of R2P and international 
intervention, is the fact that international intervention on human protection grounds is generally 
by many states viewed as military intervention in the territory of another state and humanitarian 
intervention, which purpose is to protect, prevent and stop gross violations of human rights, 
would be taken as a prima facie violation of international law.139 The notion of military 
intervention is, hence, the most problematic and controversial part of the doctrine of R2P.140 
Namely, military intervention would strongly contradict the principle of non-intervention and 
sovereignty.141 As, since the establishment of the UN, in the aftermath of the WWII, the 
principle of non-intervention had been viewed as one of the only defence mechanisms granting 
protection against international actors pressing smaller states with economic and political 
interests.142 This being a restricting factor regarding development of humanitarian intervention 
in internal situations of human rights violations.143 One of the reasons to why international 
intervention is still understood as controversial is the fact that the concept includes such a wide 
range of activities, and so the views regarding what is international intervention vary.144 When 
discussing the doctrine of R2P, international intervention consists of activity “taken against a 
state or its leaders, without its or their consent for purposes which are claimed to be 
humanitarian or protective”.145 In order to establish this kind of international intervention 
founded on human protection there needs to be clear rules, procedures and criteria to determine 
when and how to intervene.146 After international, non-military intervention has been 
undertaken, but it has failed to enhance prospects for sustainable peace and military intervention 
is therefore necessary, then military intervention should be established as legitimate.147 
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International military intervention needs to be purpose-oriented and effective, all the while 
minimising civilian damage and human loss.148 When all means of non-military intervention 
have been exhausted, military intervention can be justified, however, only in extreme cases and 
according to the criteria for military intervention set out by the ICISS.149 According to the 
ICISS-report there are six criteria for determining when military intervention is justified: 
1) right authority, 
2) just cause, 
3) right intention, 
4) last resort, 
5) proportional means and 
6) reasonable prospects. 150  
 
For military intervention to be justified for human protection and human security reasons, 
“serious and irreparable harm” needs to be occurring or threateningly likely to occur in the 
territory.151 Additionally, military intervention for the purposes of human protection is to be 
seen as an “exceptional and extraordinary measure”.152 There are two sets of circumstances 
justifying military intervention for the purposes of human protection according to the ICISS 
report.153 And when either or both of these two conditions are met, the ICISS report declares a 
military intervention decision to be “amply satisfied”.154 Still, according to the ICISS report, 
the two conditions need further explanation for defining the “conscience-shocking” situations 
intended.155 
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The principle of responsibility to protect does not distinguish between harm caused by state 
action or non-state actors, if the circumstances are grave enough, international military 
intervention for the purpose of human protection is justified by the pure knowledge of such 
grave violations and irreparable damage caused to civilians.156 Apart from the problematics 
with R2P and international military intervention, there is another equally important problem 
related to the doctrine, namely the lack of political will to react and to mobilise.157 There is a 
lack of political will regarding preventive action, non-military intervention and military 
intervention.158 
 
2.3.  Protection of Civilians 
2.3.1. Background 
The principle of civilian protection has several titles, like non-combatant immunity or the 
principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatants.159 Nonetheless, the core of 
the principle is the same no matter how the principle is addressed, namely the obligation for the 
parties to an armed conflict to refrain from directing attacks on civilian population and civilian 
objects.160 In other words, combatants and military objectives are the only legitimate aims for 
attacks during armed conflict.161 All parties to an armed conflict are responsible for protecting 
civilians, by seeking to minimize harm caused to civilians and civilian objects,162 meaning 
belligerent parties are not to consider placing military objectives in the direct vicinity of places 
where there are much civilians, like towns, villages or near schools or hospitals.163 Historically, 
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POC to some extent consists of “reducing the effects of conflict” and it has so done within the 
framework of the UN.164 A manner of protecting the civilian population and civilian objects is 
the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, indiscriminate attacks being for example attacks not 
directly targeted at military objectives.165 Indiscriminate attacks then constituting part of the 
general principles of CIL, these being: the notion of military objective; the duty to take 
precautions, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and the rule of proportionality.166 
According to Smith, Whalan and Thompson “civilian protection is now broadly understood to 
be an inherent objective of contemporary peacekeeping”,167 then pointing at the POC agenda 
of the UNSC that “focuses primarily on the implementation of protection through the mandates 
of UN peace operations”168 
 
In the Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross and the Red Crescent (ICRC) it is said that “[t]he main purpose of international 
humanitarian law is to limit the effects of armed conflict, for humanitarian reasons, by 
protecting people not participating or no longer taking part in hostilities”.169 IHL has seen 
different stages of development since the first Geneva Convention of 1864, namely the 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, the 
IHL of today therefore also looks somewhat different.170 Naturally, not only IHL has developed 
in a vacuum, but the world itself has evolved and the character of both inter-state and intra-state 
armed conflicts has changed during time. The concept of armed conflict is complex, as no 
conflict is the other alike. At the international level, the most extensive and traditional form of 
threat to a state is a situation of armed conflict and simultaneously an armed conflict represents 
“the most extreme threat” at the level of individual security.171 An armed conflict represents a 
threat to the security of the civilian population of a state and despite a situation of armed 
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conflict, a state is responsible to protect the security of its civilians, regulated by state 
obligations and international law.172 Consequently, the primary responsibility to protect its 
civilians and secure POC lies in the hands of the national state, despite of this, in a situation of 
armed conflict, this state obligation is repeatedly neglected and disrespected. States have the 
primary duty to protect their civilians and civilians have a right to protection.173 
 
The UN plays a fairly important role when regarding protection of civilians, if not to say one 
of the most important roles. Specific reference to POC has its origins in the UNSC from the last 
decade of the last century,174 since then POC has been supported in a number of reports by the 
UNSG to the UNSC,175 in UNSC resolutions,176 and in UNSC presidential statements.177 The 
former UNSG Ban Ki-moon has pointed out the following regarding POC:  
we must focus our efforts on enhancing protection where and for whom it matters most — on the 
ground, in the midst of conflict and for the hundreds of thousands of civilians who are, on a daily 
basis, at risk of, or fall victim to, serious violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law.178 
 
Accordingly, POC is part of several UNSC mandates, namely in Afghanistan,179 Central 
African Republic,180 Côte d’Ivoire,181 Darfur,182 Democratic Republic of Congo,183 Haiti,184 
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Liberia185 and Sudan.186 Peacekeeping operations have different mandates with the purpose to 
secure basic protection like security, food, medical assistance and the rule of law.187 Measuring 
effectiveness or success of a peacekeeping mission varies according to its mandate, however, 
to “the extent that traditional peacekeeping missions helped to manage or end conflict, they 
coincidentally may have contributed to protecting civilians”.188 
 
A situation of armed conflict is at its foremost a situation of exception and in order to be 
determined and classified as either an IAC or a NIAC, an armed conflict needs to fulfil requisite 
conditions set forth under IHL.189 However, the legal determination of ‘armed conflict’ itself 
under IHL is simple; the requirement is a presence of militarily structured armed resistance or 
“of UN troops being involved in the fighting”.190 An inferior affair within a particular 
jurisdiction may start as a situation that activates R2P, then develop into a situation of armed 
conflict and hence engage POC and still further develop into an IAC with several 
counterparts.191 The situation the most likely to appear, is there to be involvement from 
international instances as well, and not to mention the UNSC, it being the one organ accorded 
to decide upon military intervention when regarding international security and peace, and the 
maintenance thereof.192 In order to identify what constitutes an armed attack one can pose the 
question whether all use of force, also all prohibited force is an armed attack.193 
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An example of a situation that was initiated by engagement of R2P and not as a situation of 
armed conflict, and then developed into a situation that parallelly engaged the POC in a situation 
of armed conflict, is Libya in 2011.194 The situation in Libya in 2011 was first described by the 
UNSC as a situation of “gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the 
repression of peaceful demonstrators” and “use of force against civilians”, but not as an armed 
conflict.195 Thus, a situation of crimes against humanity that engaged the R2P. Few weeks later 
the situation in Libya was already referred to as an armed conflict by the UNSC and POC was 
engaged as POC applies not only in IACs but also in NIACs.196 The UNSC Resolutions 1970 
and 1973, from February and March 2011, were a turning point for the doctrine of R2P, as they 
marked the development “from concept to concrete action”.197 
 
Despite the humanitarian wish to protect civilians during armed conflict, the principle of POC 
is far from self-evident in practice.198 Reality and practice are not at the same level as the 
existing rules and principles for protection.199 Article 3 Common to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions addresses the minimum requirements of civilian protection in NIAC and is not to 
be disregarded in the discussion regarding armed conflicts, IHL and its principle of POC.200 
POC consists of civilians and civilian objects not being made the target of an attack nor of a 
planned attack.201  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
the ICJ have contributed to the shaping of the view on POC in armed conflicts by their 
judgements. The ICJ and its advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, as well as the 
threat or use thereof in the case Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons from 1996, 
                                               
194 See Resolution 1970, 26 February 2011, UN doc. S/RES/1970, Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011, UN doc. 
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was the first of the international courts to address jurisprudence regarding the principle of 
civilian protection and non-combatant immunity.202 The ICJ stated there are two “cardinal 
principles” being the principles of protection of civilian population and the prohibition of 
causing “unnecessary suffering to combatants”.203 The principle of POC is by the opinion of 
the ICJ “aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes 
the distinction between combatants and non-combatants”.204 This meaning that “states must 
never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are 
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets”.205 POC population was 
discussed by the ICTY in, among others, the Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic case.206 The Tadic case 
has contributed to the development of both IHL and POC.207 
 
Many of the principles and rules of the APII “can now be regarded as declaratory of existing 
rules or as having crystallised emerging rules of customary law or as else as having been 
strongly instrumental in their evolution as general principles”,208 this can be seen in the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber judgement in the case of the Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic. The ICTY 
judgement in the Tadic case stated CIL is applicable to civil wars and “aimed at protecting the 
civilian population from the hostilities”.209 CIL or the formation thereof and “the formation of 
general rules or principles designed to protect civilians or civilian objects from hostilities or, 
more generally, to protect those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities” is seen 
as valid by the ICTY.210 In other words, ICTY regarded POC as a legal rule in NIAC, by 
acknowledging the purposes and logics of IHL and not only by focusing on the actual behaviour 
of states in armed conflicts.211  
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Article 57 of the API implicates all precautions should be taken into account when planning an 
attack, in order to spare civilian population from death and serious injury, as well as to spare 
civilian objects from unnecessary damage.212 If it is uncertain whether a civilian object is used 
for military actions or not, it is to be assumed that the object is not used for military actions, but 
being used for civilian purposes.213 As mentioned before, ammunition and weapons storage are 
distinct military objectives and therefore are not to be placed near densely populated areas or 
in the close vicinity of civilian objects like a facility of primary education or other educational 
facilities, as it is an evident military target running high risk of being attacked by opposing 
parties.214 Using education facilities for military purposes while pupils and teachers are in the 
building(s) used for education, demonstrates a failure of fulfilling the duty to take precautions 
when planning an attack and to minimise the harm caused to civilians and civilian objects.215 
Civilians may not be used as human shields or removed from their natural habitat, in order to 
change the character of an objective for a planned attack, by way of example, by making a 
military objective a civilian object by moving a civilian population to a military objective or to 
the close vicinity of a military objective.216 The use of human shields is prohibited, hence, 
preventing civilians e.g. pupils and teachers from leaving a school building is a manner of using 
human shields.217 
 
The merge of civil wars has replaced inter-state conflicts and thus, war crimes have been 
exposed to extended groups of vulnerable people.218 “Since times immemorial, man has sought 
security”,219 security from threats that could affect both national and international security and 
the means to grant a feeling of security.220 Threats caused by nature are, by way of example 
threats of shortage of water, threats of natural disasters like earth quakes or tsunamis and threats 
caused by man are i.e. threats of a terror attack, threats of poverty, and threats concerning 
national security posed by another state e.g. the threat of an armed conflict or threat of using 
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nuclear weapons.221 The threat of war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide are growingly 
exposed to children and women, which has been highlighted at a constant by the UN at several 
occasions.222 Young girls are exposed to augmented security risks caused by armed conflicts, 
besides leading to fear of sexual harassment by armed forces, school drop-out and violence, in 
addition, this can develop into long-term effects for overall gender inequality in society.223 
Refugee camps and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) where civilians in an 
inescapable way are close, if not mixed together with combatants and other elements of war, 
are numerous and can render both protection and danger for civilians.224 Civilians who flee 
across borders are to be protected by the governments of the jurisdiction they flee to, whereas 
protection of IDPs falls to the national governments.225 Over time, the concept of security has 
transformed and developed.226 International assistance is not accepted by all governments, or 
the process of accepting international assistance is prolonged, sometimes intentionally it 
seems.227 During armed conflict, state practice and principles of IHL do not always coincide. 
When there is an armed conflict, rules of IHL are somewhat forgotten or neglected by states 
and consequently, humanitarian rules are violated when there is an armed conflict.228  
 
POC has evolved during time, however halting it sometimes seems to be and especially it has 
evolved during the last decade of the 20th century.229 Humanitarian assistance has evolved in 
several different ways, like the establishment of intergovernmental legislative frameworks 
within the UN; of the UNGA, of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and of the 
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promoting political and economic security”. UN Secretary-General Report A/40/553, 26 August 1985, p. 10: 
security as defined by a UN group of experts “a condition in which States consider that there is no danger of 
military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own 
development and progress. International security is thus the result and the sum of the security of each and every 
State member of the international community; accordingly, international security cannot be reached without full 
international co-operation. However, security is a relative rather than an absolute term. National and international 
security need to be viewed as matters of degree.” 
227 Francis and Sampford “Introduction” in Francis, Popovski and Sampford (eds.), 2012, p. 2. 
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UNSC.230 Apart from this normative development, organisational mechanisms, such as the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), evolved for coordination of humanitarian 
assistance.231 The 1990s also saw an expansion of both civil and military actors involved in the 
chain of providing humanitarian assistance and protecting civilians.232 This then taking POC 
and humanitarian assistance to a new level of priority. Nevertheless, the 1990s was a time 
featured by a number of humanitarian tragedies like Rwanda (1994), Srebrenica (1995) and 
Kosovo (1999) to name a few. These events demonstrated a weak ability of the international 
community to protect civilians during armed conflict.233 At the same time, humanitarian 
emergencies like these made it problematic to reach consensus decisions among UN 
members.234 Since the 1990s, multiple efforts have been taken in order to establish effective 
POC during armed conflict. New strategies are developed and employed, strategies that are 
based on human rights and effective POC.235 The doctrine of R2P has evolved as one of the 
most distinguished measures of protection of civilians.236  
 
2.3.2. Legal Framework of Protection of Civilians 
Civilian protection is one of the cornerstones of the law of armed conflict and the principle of 
civilian protection is one of the most important principles in IHL.237 IHL can be translated into 
the law of war, jus in bello and the law of armed conflict. IHL applies in any situation of armed 
conflict, no matter unlawful or lawful a conflict.238 The four Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols cover the laws of war and are, hence, strongly connected with POC, 
however, the GCIV is concentrating on protecting civilians in times of war.239 The UNSC, 
through its authority to maintain international peace and security, possesses the authority for 
action in questions of POC.240 
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2.4. Legal Definition of Civilian and Civilian Objects according to International 
Humanitarian Law 
2.4.1. Civilians 
According to Article 51 of the API, civilians are to be protected from hostilities and direct attack 
during armed conflict, therewith, targeting of civilians and civilian objects is prohibited.241 A 
civilian or a civilian person, is a person not member of any armed force, also a person not 
directly taking part in hostilities is to be regarded a civilian person according to Article 50 of 
the API.242 A person directly participating in hostilities during an armed conflict is therefore 
not to be seen a civilian person.243 This rule applies for all persons, including members of non-
organised armed groups like rebellion groupings or militias that do not form part of any state’s 
national armed forces; when one openly carries arms or participates actively in hostilities, 
during an armed conflict as part of an organised armed force, then one is to be regarded not a 
civilian but a person participating actively in the armed conflict, a combatant or a person 
constituting part of an armed force.244 According to Article 48 of the API and its basic rule, a 
distinction between combatants and civilians should be made at all times.245 This “most 
elementary form” of the principle of civilian protection is frequently violated and especially so 
in NIACs.246 Targeting civilians or civilian objects, like pupils, teachers and school buildings, 
in both IACs and in NIACs is prohibited, in spite of this, the principle of non-attacking and 
non-targeting of civilians and civilian objects is too often violated,247 especially schools, 
hospitals and other similar protected zones, as well as their staff are constantly being attacked 
and occupied by fighting forces, this causing more distress, more wounded and more deaths.248 
This obligation contains the requirement for the parties to an armed conflict to distinguish 
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between civilians and combatants at all times during an armed conflict.249 As the principle of 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants has been widely violated by states, legal 
scholars have pledged for a more balanced view on reality and ideals, as the situation of today 
contains a gap between those two.250 A gap, that does not seem to be closer to diminishing than 
it would have been ever before.251 The difference between reality and ideals, together with the 
indifference of states towards  humanitarian principles, have led legal scholars to a conclusion 
of denial of the principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatants, which on the 
one hand has resulted in the apologetic and on the other hand in the utopian view of POC during 
armed conflicts.252 
 
In 2000, in the Trial Chambers judgment of the Blaškic case, the ICTY gave a definition of 
civilians as “persons who are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces”.253 For such time 
as a civilian person directly participates in an armed conflict by taking part in hostilities, that 
person is no longer to be regarded a civilian.254 In other words, a civilian person can lose his or 
her civilian status, when and, if he or she participates in the hostilities of an armed conflict.255 
Consequently, a civilian person loses his or her civilian status the minute he or she directs 
actions in order to participate in hostilities of an armed conflict.256 As a civilian, is then to be 
regarded a person not taking active or direct part in an armed conflict; indirect participation on 
the other hand, can be participation in humanitarian work, like aiding wounded and sick persons 
during an armed conflict, those persons indirectly participating in such actions are still to be 
regarded civilian persons; for as long as a person does not actively participate in the hostilities 
in any way.257 Loss of civilian status, by actively participating in hostilities, and being a 
combatant are not birds of a feather, hence, a civilian taking active part in hostilities without 
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belonging to any organised armed force does not automatically become entitled to combatant 
nor prisoner-of-war status upon capture, but can be tried under national law for participation in 
conflict.258 
 
Levée en masse, or when the population of an un-occupied area spontaneously resists invading 
troops by taking up arms “without having time to form themselves into an armed force”  is an 
exception to the rule of civilian immunity.259 
 
2.4.2. Civilian Objects 
“Civilian objects are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they are military 
objectives”, Rule 10 in Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law thus, refers to 
civilians and civilian objects only being protected by IHL for as long as no participation in 
direct hostile acts are taken.260 This meaning, that by the moment a civilian object in any way 
directly and distinctly participates in the hostilities of an armed conflict, it loses its distinction 
as a civilian object and is therefore set under the plausible risk of an attack.261 A civilian object 
loses its protection only during that time, when it is a military objective, which by way of 
example, means a civilian object, like a primary school facility can be a legitimate military 
target only during the time it is used for military purposes e.g. as a firing position or as an 
ammunition storage.262 This can be interpreted as if a school facility is used as a firing position 
during night, then any planned attack should be conducted during this time; when the facility 
is emptied of civilians, e.g. children and teaching staff that are in the building during daytime.263 
During daytime when the building is no longer used for military purposes, it is considered a 
civilian object and should therefore be treated as a civilian object and not be made the subject 
of attack.264 As it is prohibited to intentionally conduct attacks against purely civilian objects, 
like primary schools, hence this is seen to be a crime against international law.265 This also 
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being stated as a war crime in Article 8 of the 1998 ICC Statute.266 It is prohibited to 
intentionally direct attacks at civilian hospitals, hospitals being marked and therefore also 
visible from aircrafts, this making it more difficult claiming targeting an ammunition and 
weapons storage nearby, as a hospital is marked and distinguishable from surrounding 
buildings.267 
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3. Legal Foundation for Extraterritorial Protection of Civilians 
3.1. Territory and Extraterritorial 
3.1.1. The Concept of Territory 
This chapter will present jurisdiction, as a way of conduct to what extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and extraterritorial protection of civilians contains. Firstly, the concept of territory is presented 
and secondly the concept of extraterritoriality. Thirdly, jurisdiction in a general manner is 
discussed, followed by sub-chapters regarding more specific aspects of jurisdiction in situations 
of extraterritorial protection, such as the principles of subjective and objective territoriality and 
the principle of passive personality. Lastly, criteria for jurisdiction in situations of 
extraterritorial protection and respect for state sovereignty and exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction are presented. 
 
A territory, or an area of territory, can consist of land and territorial sea, in addition, the concept 
of territory consists of and includes seabed, subsoil, islands, islets and rocks.268 Land territory 
and territorial sea, seabed and subsoil are covered by territorial sovereignty, territorial 
sovereignty being one out of four types of regime, in spatial terms of law.269 State competences 
when regarding territory, are most often defined in terms of sovereignty and jurisdiction.270 
Whereas sovereignty refers to the legal personality of statehood as sovereignty as “plenary 
power over territory” and jurisdiction refers to specific aspects of statehood and sovereignty,271 
like rights and powers.272 Legal state competences include disposal of territory.273 
 
3.1.2. The Concept of Extraterritorial  
By way of introduction, extraterritorial is a legal concept with varying use in international law 
discourse, all depending on the situation at hand.274 Primarily, ‘exterritorial’ is associated with 
diplomatic freedom of embassies from jurisdiction of the territory of residence, meaning 
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exclusion of territorial government.275 Whereas ‘extraterritorial’ comprehends conduct “taking 
place beyond, regardless of a territory” or it can define a subject or conduct that is located 
outside a territory.276 Exterritorial and extraterritorial are thus not to be mixed, as the two 
notions are far from identical. 
 
When speaking of extraterritorial from a strictly linguistic point of view, one can see the word 
originates from Latin, extra territorium, and can simply be interpreted as “outside the 
territory”.277 Prescriptive enforcement of judicial exercise of jurisdiction outside a state’s 
territory or jurisdiction, is under international law referred to as ‘extraterritoriality’.278 Both 
territorial and extraterritorial are concepts open to interpretation and much relies upon the legal 
system of the state concerned and their legislation.279 When put as the contradiction of 
“territorial”,280 meaning within the territory of a state or e.g. territorial waters meaning waters 
under the jurisdiction of a state,281 extraterritorial is seen as a place elongated from the territory 
of a specific state, outside the borders of this particular sovereign state.282 All the same, 
extraterritorial includes a notion of geography and location, as “outside the territory”,283 as well 
as “inside the borders”,284 are notions used for defining the concept. Location of conduct and 
location of party are likewise two determining factors in the discussion on extraterritoriality.285 
Extraterritoriality, when regarding the legal notion of extraterritoriality, can be relevant in 
various kinds of questions, e.g. geographic scope of laws,286 court power over foreign 
defendants,287 rights of foreigners detained outside national territory,288 ability of courts to 
consider causes of action taking place out of activity abroad.289 
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3.2. Jurisdiction Regulates Extraterritorial Protection of Civilians 
3.2.1. Jurisdiction in General 
Before demonstrating the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect, this chapter will 
begin with a short discussion on jurisdiction in general. Through issues of states’ use of control, 
jurisdiction has become a central question in international law. From a strictly linguistic point 
of view ‘jurisdiction’ derives from the Latin words for ‘law’ and ‘to speak’ (jus or juris, and 
dicere) and can hence be interpreted as “to speak the law”.290 Jurisdiction in its most simple 
definition is about allocating competence.291 Jurisdiction is what determines how far, ratione 
loci, the laws of a state might reach.292 From a legal point of view, jurisdiction contains power 
to make legal decisions within a territory over which a legal authority, like a court or similar 
state-run institution, can extend its legal authority.293 Whereas, in international human rights 
treaties, it is the jurisdiction of a state that is referred to, and not the jurisdiction of a court.294 
However, through globalisation, states have been pushed to act in circumstances beyond their 
territory and their territorial power. Jurisdiction is of preliminary importance, an issue that 
needs to be decided primarily. Jurisdiction of a state is normally confined to a specific, 
distinguished territory, but for this research it is relevant to research how that jurisdiction can 
be applied outside the national territory. Consequently, there is no one single meaning, but on 
the contrary, several meanings for the word ‘jurisdiction’ in international law.295 
 
Under PIL there are basically two different approaches which are logically posed to the question 
of jurisdiction, namely, either states are allowed to exercise jurisdiction as they see fit, unless 
there are any prohibitive rules to the contrary, or states are prohibited from exercising 
jurisdiction as they see fit, unless there are any permissive rules to the contrary.296 When states 
adopt laws that do not govern purely domestic matters, then jurisdiction is affected by 
international law.297 Territory, nationality and effects of a conduct, affect how states conceive 
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questions of jurisdiction.298 The wording ‘within its jurisdiction’, is used in international human 
rights treaties to demonstrate the width of jurisdiction by showing national jurisdiction also can 
apply to territories outside the national borders of a state as ‘within its jurisdiction’ includes 
“any territory under the effective control of its authorities”,299 like e.g. aircrafts or ships 
registered in that state or when the offender or the victim is a national of that particular state.300 
According to international law, a state is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction in another state 
unless there is an international treaty or CIL that would permit a state to exercise its jurisdiction 
outside its national borders. One of the reasons as to why extraterritorial jurisdiction is both 
challenging and debated is because it is difficult to claim jurisdiction.301 Respect of state 
sovereignty is one of the main principles of international law, it is also crucial for maintaining 
good international relations and this is why it needs to be justifiable to claim jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial conduct.302 In international human rights treaties, jurisdiction is perceived as 
control over territory and control over the people within the territory, contrary to “jurisdiction 
to prescribe rules of domestic law and to enforce them”.303 The subjects of international law are 
states, which are indeed territorial entities, whereas sovereignty gives title to this power over 
territory. International law, however, is inconsiderate towards and provides no protection for 
“sovereignty for its own sake”.304 This is demonstrated in the Island of Palmas case: 
Territorial sovereignty, as has already been said, involves the exclusive right to display the activities 
of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights 
of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together 
with the rights which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory. Without manifesting 
its territorial sovereignty in a manner corresponding to circumstances, the State cannot fulfil this 
duty. Territorial sovereignty cannot limit itself to its negative side, i.e. to excluding the activities of 
other States; for it serves to divide between nations the space upon which human activities are 
employed, in order to assure them at all points the minimum of protection of which international 
law is the guardian.305 
 
And similarly emphasised by the ICJ in its Namibia advisory opinion: 
The fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the Territory does not release it from 
its obligations and responsibilities under international law towards other States in respect of the 
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exercise of its powers in relation to this Territory. Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty 
or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts affecting other States.306 
 
Consequently, the lack of sovereignty or legal title, does not exempt states from respecting 
human rights.307 Application of human rights treaties rely upon “actual power exercised over 
it”.308 A state’s capacity to protect, or to violate human rights, within a territory is in other 
words unbound by sovereignty, but strongly bound to power over territory. Milanovic has 
argued that:  
[…] ‘jurisdiction’ in various human rights treaties refers to a power that a state exercises over a 
territory, and perhaps also over individuals. When the state obtains this power it must, with due 
diligence, fulfil its obligation to secure or ensure the human rights of all persons within its 
jurisdiction. This power is a question of fact, of actual authority and control.309 
 
Therefore, as contracting parties to multiple human rights treaties, state responsibility can be 
said to impose extraterritorial obligations to protect human rights, as human rights treaties 
provide this above-mentioned understanding of jurisdiction. 
 
The general bases of jurisdiction are: the principle of territory, the principle of nationality, the 
principle of passive personality, the principle of protection or security and the effects doctrine 
or the principle of objective territoriality.310 These general principles of jurisdiction together 
with international jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction will be presented in sub-chapters 3.2.3. 
to 3.2.7..311 
 
3.2.2. Prescriptive, Enforcement and Judicial Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction can be classified into three different types of jurisdiction: prescriptive, enforcement 
and judicial jurisdiction. Prescriptive jurisdiction can also be referred to as legislative 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction to prescribe or compétence normative, whereas enforcement 
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jurisdiction can be referred to as executive jurisdiction, jurisdiction to enforce or compétence 
d’execution and judicial jurisdiction that can be referred to as adjudicatory jurisdiction, curial 
or judicial jurisdiction.312 Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the power to make laws or to make 
rules, enforcement jurisdiction refers to the power to enforce the aforementioned laws or rules 
and judicial jurisdiction refers to the power to decide on matters occurred in the territory (and 
abroad), hence, to apply these prescribed laws or rules.313 Adjudicative jurisdiction refers to 
courts’ power to claim jurisdiction over persons.314 Judicial jurisdiction can be seen as part of 
prescriptive jurisdiction or as part of enforcement jurisdiction, as well as it can be designated 
as part of both categories.315 Judicial jurisdiction can be categorised as prescriptive when the 
jurisdictional scope of legal acts is interpreted by courts and judicial jurisdiction can be 
categorised as enforcement jurisdiction when courts give effect to laws.316 Enforcement 
jurisdiction is also exercised when a court convicts, punishes and sentences.317 It is possible for 
prescriptive jurisdiction to be extraterritorial, whereas jurisdiction to enforce is “strictly 
territorial”.318  
 
When exercised extraterritorially, these three different types of jurisdiction can lead to varying 
levels of intrusiveness.319 Enforcement jurisdiction exercised outside a state’s territory is 
problematic, if not to say the most problematic according to Cooreman, as enforcement outside 
one’s own territory is “clearly intruding on the sovereign domain of other states” and it violates 
the three basic principles of rules on state jurisdiction in PIL,320 namely sovereignty, non-
intervention and cooperation.321 State-run enforcement jurisdiction outside the state’s own 
territory can be practised in different ways as there are several forms of this kind of intrusion, 
by way of example, investigations of criminal or administrative procedures of another country 
and physical force by state organs.322 Prescriptive jurisdiction is not as intrusive as enforcement 
jurisdiction, as norms governing persons or conduct outside a state’s territory can be prescribed 
by states. Nevertheless, this does not mean extraterritorial prescribing of rules always has an 
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impact on other states, especially so when there is no effort to enforce the rules outside the 
territory.323 However, expecting that states wish to carry into effect these kind of prescribed 
rules, is legitimate.324 International law can allow for “a state to assert the applicability of its 
criminal law to given conduct but, because the author of the conduct is abroad” that state cannot 
enforce its criminal law.325 
 
3.2.3. The Principle of Territoriality 
When discussing jurisdiction and international law, jurisdiction is closely bound to territory, as 
states are regarded as having a monopoly of force within their borders.326 In international law, 
the territoriality principle is the most basic principle of jurisdiction,327 and according to Higgins 
it is to be considered “natural that, within a territory, a state expects its laws to apply”.328 In 
common law, it has traditionally been viewed that jurisdiction is “inherently territorial”.329 
Traditionally, states’ exercise of jurisdiction was in general limited to persons, property and 
acts within the territory of the state.330 Territory together with government and population 
“constitute the physical and social base for the state” and this base needs to be physically 
identified as well as legally delimited.331 This competence over events and persons (persons = 
nationals, foreigners, residents, visitors or persons otherwise present in the territory) within a 
territory can be said to be the starting point for jurisdiction and it is the most usual basis for 
jurisdiction, as it entails the fact that states can and may, prescribe laws within that said 
territory.332 All this, while under the duty not to intervene with any other states’ exclusive 
jurisdiction over their territory.333 In a situation where a national of a state has conducted a 
crime and left the territory, all the time while the national is abroad, prescribed rules might be 
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limited with no enforcement.334 Upon return to the home country, however, the national can 
face enforcement of the prescribed rules and be bound by the laws of his or her home country.335 
 
However, overlapping jurisdiction is possible when,336 to give an example, a national of state 
A conducts unlawful behaviour in state B and, hence, violates the law within that state B. It is 
universally recognised that the courts of the state where a crime is committed, state B in the 
above-mentioned example, may exercise jurisdiction seen as “the essential territoriality of 
sovereignty” and a result of legal competences that states have.337 When other states are affected 
by actions undertaken by state A, international law plays a role and jurisdiction can be limited 
by international law.338 State A can use a certain area of state B, without it being unlawful, as 
long as state A has the consent of state B to have that use of the specific area, or to provide 
another example, to have its forces stationed within the boundaries of state B and have exclusive 
jurisdiction over its own forces.339 Consent by state B is of particular importance; when there 
is consent by host state B, then state A does not have any claim to sovereignty over parts of 
state B.340 Hence, enforcement “always requires the consent of the territorial state” meaning 
prescribed rules by the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction does not equal to extraterritorial 
enforcement.341 In the commentaries to the Draft articles on the Law of Treaties, the United 
Nations International Law Commission (ILC) has pointed out in Article 20 that valid consent 
for a conduct by another state “precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the 
consenting state”.342 
 
Jurisdiction can be limited by international treaties and by regional human rights treaties. 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 
contains, a limitation to its jurisdiction.343 Additionally, Article 1 poses an obligation on its 
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state parties to secure the rights contained in the ECHR.344 In Bankovic and Others v. Belgium 
and 16 Other Contracting States, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) considered 
the jurisdictional competence of state parties to be “primarily territorial”,345 based on Article 1 
of the ECHR and its wording “within their jurisdiction”.346 In Bankovic, the wording ‘within 
their jurisdiction’ was then further defined and discussed: 
 
59. As to the “ordinary meaning” of the relevant term in Article 1 of the Convention, the Court 
is satisfied that, from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a 
State is primarily territorial. While international law does not exclude a State’s exercise of 
jurisdiction extra-territorially, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction (including nationality, flag, 
diplomatic and consular relations, effect, protection, passive personality and universality) are, as a 
general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant States (Mann, 
“The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law”, RdC, 1964, Vol. 1; Mann, “The Doctrine of 
Jurisdiction in International Law, Twenty Years Later”, RdC, 1984, Vol. 1; 
Bernhardt, Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Edition 1997, Vol. 3, pp. 55-59 “Jurisdiction 
of States” and Edition 1995, Vol. 2, pp. 337-343 “Extra-territorial Effects of Administrative, 
Judicial and Legislative Acts”; Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th Edition 1992 (Jennings and 
Watts), Vol. 1, § 137; P.M. Dupuy, Droit International Public, 4th Edition 1998, p. 61; and 
Brownlie, Principles of International Law, 5th Edition 1998, pp. 287, 301 and 312-314). 
60. Accordingly, for example, a State’s competence to exercise jurisdiction over its own 
nationals abroad is subordinate to that State’s and other States’ territorial competence 
(Higgins, Problems and Process (1994), at p. 73; and Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Droit International 
Public, 6th Edition 1999 (Daillier and Pellet), p. 500). In addition, a State may not actually exercise 
jurisdiction on the territory of another without the latter’s consent, invitation or acquiescence, unless 
the former is an occupying State in which case it can be found to exercise jurisdiction in that 
territory, at least in certain respects (Bernhardt, cited above, Vol. 3 at p. 59 and Vol. 2 at pp. 338-
340; Oppenheim, cited above, at § 137; P.M. Dupuy, cited above, at pp. 64-65; Brownlie, cited 
above, at p. 313; Cassese, International Law, 2001, p. 89; and, most recently, the “Report on the 
Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by their Kin-States” adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 48th Plenary Meeting, Venice, 19-20 October 2001).  
61. The Court is of the view, therefore, that Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to 
reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being 
exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case 
(see, mutatis mutandis and in general, Select Committee of Experts on Extraterritorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction, European Committee on Crime Problems, Council of Europe, “Extraterritorial 
Criminal Jurisdiction”, Report published in 1990, at pp. 8-30). 347 
 
Thus, the ECtHR was of the view that ‘within their jurisdiction’, reflects “this ordinary and 
essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and 
requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case”.348 In other words, 
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the ECtHR was of the opinion that the bombing of a foreign territory was insufficient for an 
extraterritorial jurisdictional link to be established between the Serbian victims and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization member states.349 Even though the Bankovic case was ruled 
inadmissible by the ECtHR, the ECtHR “did not say that these countries could carry out human 
rights violations with impunity outside their territory”,350 and the fact that the ECtHR held that 
it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Bankovic case “the de facto result was that there were no Court 
procedures available for the individuals in the case, where they had been adversely affected by 
the actions of foreign states”.351 Thus, this procedural limitation of the ECHR resulted in 
“impunity from legal redress for states”.352  
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) from 1966 contains a 
jurisdictional clause similar to the one in the ECHR.353 In the ICCPR it is stated that states are 
responsible “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction” the rights set out in the convention.354 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR is formulated in 
a broad manner as ‘within its territory’ and ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ are separated by ‘and’, 
due to this, these claims are to be interpreted separately.355 The United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (UNHRCm) in its General Comment 31 on Article 2, adopted on 26 May 2004, 
further affirmed that jurisdiction is linked to the effective control and authority exercised by a 
state also in an extraterritorial setting.356 Furthermore, this implies the ICCPR is to be applied 
to persons that are inside the territory of a state or subject to its jurisdiction. This interpretation 
has also been supported by the ICJ.357 When comparing the ECHR and the ICCPR to the CAT, 
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one can see the link between territory and jurisdiction is most clear in the CAT,358 as it uses the 
wording “in any territory under its jurisdiction” in several articles.359 
 
3.2.4. The Principles of Subjective and Objective Territoriality 
Territoriality can be subjective or objective. Subjective territoriality comprehends that at the 
time of the conduct the accused perpetrator is present in the territory.360 Subjective territoriality 
creates jurisdiction over crimes initiated or started within the state, even when and if completed 
or consummated in a foreign state.361 Whereas objective territoriality comprehends referring to 
the jurisdiction of a state, when the conduct only partially occurred in that state’s territory. An 
illustrative example for this is that of death on the territory of the forum, caused by firing a gun 
across borders.362 In other words, objective territorial jurisdiction can be asserted in a situation 
where a gun is fired in state A, but it causes injury in state B. 
 
The principle of objective territoriality, or the effects doctrine, creates jurisdiction over crimes 
when “any essential constituent element of a crime is consummated on the forum state’s 
territory”.363 The principle of objective jurisdiction allows for states to exercise jurisdiction 
when activities originate abroad but “have substantial, direct and foreseeable effects upon or in 
its national territory”.364 There are, however, other examples as well ,where the principle can 
be employed to found jurisdiction in a case,365 cases of conspiracy,366 cases of immigration 
law367 and cases of violations of antitrust,368 to name a few. It needs to be mentioned here that 
under the law of the United States of America, claims of territoriality “can be based either on 
local conduct or on sufficient local effects”,369 and “that effects within the territory of the United 
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States constitute[d] a valid basis of legislative jurisdiction”,370 as the cases mentioned in the 
examples are by majority cases from the Supreme Court of the United States of America. 
 
In the SS “Lotus”case, the principle of objective territory gained general support and the 
principle of objective territorial jurisdiction was the basis for the majority view in the case.371 
Buxbaum has stated that objective territoriality can be invoked when it is needed “to argue that 
the location of that conduct’s effect within a particular country is sufficient to give that country 
jurisdiction to regulate”.372 In other words, Buxbaum refers to situations when “the government 
of a nation in which defendant corporations are located […] may invoke the concept of 
"extraterritoriality" to argue that the regulating country would overstep its authority if it applied 
its laws to foreign conduct”.373 In prescriptive jurisdiction, the effects doctrine can be invoked 
when extraterritorial offences cause harmful effects in the prescribing state while not matching 
the criteria for territorial jurisdiction or when the harmful effect is not “sufficiently vital to the 
internal or external security of the state in question” in order to pleading of the protective 
principle to be justified.374 The effects doctrine is controversial, yet not objectionable in all 
cases.375 This doctrine can be said to have grown out from the objective territoriality principle 
and concerns situations when no “constituent element of the offence takes place within the 
territory of the prescribing state”.376 In spite of the fact that the effects doctrine can be very 
controversial in some areas, like in the field of antitrust and competition law, in some other 
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areas extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction based on the effects doctrine can be established as 
uncontroversial in relation to certain offences, like inchoate conspiracies to murder and import 
of illegal drugs.377  
 
When combined, the principle of subjective territoriality and the principle of objective 
territoriality, in situations of crimes occurring across borders, give the effect of both states 
having jurisdiction over the case matter.378 In a situation where a state’s conduct effects multiple 
states, then there is a possibility of rivalling jurisdictions. Multiple jurisdictional competence is 
common, as there is a lack of “natural regulator”,379 hence, there are no assumptions that 
persons or even corporations or states will only be regulated once.380 Naturally, situations where 
more than only one state wishes to regulate a situation and thus sees the situation under its 
particular jurisdiction do occur.381 
 
3.2.5. The Principle of Nationality 
Nationality has generally been recognised as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction and it has 
so been done in various cases.382 Nationality has been used as evidence of allegiance and as an 
aspect of sovereignty.383 The principle of nationality is besides this also referred to as the active 
personality principle.384 When claiming for nationality jurisdiction, “it is often asserted that the 
person over whom the state purports to exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction must have been a 
national at the time of the offence”, 385  in other words, the offender must have been a national 
at the time when the offence was committed. According to Higgins “the idea of a duty to punish 
nationals who harm foreigners finds much support”.386 The most problematic aspect of 
exercising jurisdiction based on the principle of nationality, is to determine and identify “who 
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is a national abroad”.387 Crawford states that nationality is a common basis for jurisdiction,388 
and that in the modern era, the view on relation of nationality provides a “basis for responsibility 
and protection”,389 not however, completely in the same manner as de Vattel expressed it in the 
18th century: “ [q]uiconque maltraite un citoyen offense indirectement l’Etat, qui doit protéger 
ce citoyen”.390 According to de Vattel, the link was indirect, as not any harm to a foreigner 
could be said to constitute an injury to the aliens’ state as such.391 The link of nationality, 
however, authorises a state to exercise jurisdiction. 
 
3.2.6. The Principle of Passive Personality and the Principle of Protection or Security 
According to the somewhat controversial and much criticised general basis of jurisdiction, 
namely the principle of passive personality or passive nationality, aliens or foreigners “may be 
punished for acts abroad harmful to nationals of the forum”.392 In other words, exercise of 
jurisdiction on the basis of the passive personality principle is to exercise jurisdiction on the 
“basis of harm to a national while abroad”,393 as the principle “recognizes that each state has a 
legitimate interest in protecting the safety of its citizens when they journey outside national 
boundaries".394 By way of example, a national of state A commits an act of crime in state B 
against a national of state C, and then by use of the passive personality principle state C has 
jurisdiction in the matter. The passive personality principle concentrates primarily on the effects 
of the conducted crime rather than territory or nationality.395 The passive personality principle 
can be said to have caused more controversy than the principles of nationality or territoriality, 
as it is perceived as somewhat aggressive.396 The S.S. “Lotus” case demonstrated 
comprehensive exercise of passive personality jurisdiction, as punishment of acts conducted 
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abroad, against persons of Turkish nationality, were provided by the Turkish penal code.397 
Although controversial, the principle of passive personality has still managed to reach a so-
called condition of consensus on the use of passive personality, that is, cases much of the time 
linked to international terrorism.398 The protective or security principle of jurisdiction is rather 
open and wide, often invoked by various reasons as almost all states assume jurisdiction for 
acts conducted abroad which endanger and affect the internal or external security of their state 
as well as other key interests of states.399 
 
3.2.7. The Principle of Universality 
Apart from national jurisdiction, international jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction can be 
distinguished as distinct fields of jurisdiction.400 According to O’Keefe universal jurisdiction 
can be defined in the following way: 
universal jurisdiction can be defined as prescriptive jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by 
persons who, at the time of the commission, are non-resident aliens, where such offences are not 
deemed to constitute threats to the fundamental interests of the prescribing state or, in appropriate 
cases, to give rise to effects within its territory.401  
 
International jurisdiction is not to be considered as the equivalent of universal jurisdiction, thus, 
international jurisdiction is “jurisdiction over international crimes as exercised by internat ional 
tribunals”,402 and universal jurisdiction “is national jurisdiction over international crimes”.403 
Universal jurisdiction can, hence, be said to be a form of prescriptive jurisdiction.404 Crawford 
has stated that “universal jurisdiction is defined by the character of the crime concerned, rather 
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than by the presence of some kind of nexus to the prescribing state”.405 Universal jurisdiction 
is permitted by international law in regard to certain offences against the international 
community, in other words, the nature of the act committed authorises a state to exercise its 
jurisdiction and to apply its laws regardless of the fact that the act has occurred outside its 
territory, even though the act has been conducted by a non-national and no national(s) were 
harmed by the act.406 Crimes subject to universal jurisdiction in contemporary times are 
particularly heinous crimes that might pose a threat to international peace and order,407 the so-
called “core crimes” of CIL,408 namely genocide,409 crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
especially grave breaches of the Hague Conventions of 1907 and of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949.410 Another crime likely to being subject to universal jurisdiction is torture within the 
meaning of the CAT of 1984.411 The ICC has a special role when concerning both universal 
and international jurisdiction, in some cases “[t]he ICC might urge States to refrain from 
exercising universal jurisdiction in cases that national courts are unable to adequately prosecute 
and that the ICC is purportedly better placed to address”.412 Simultaneously, the ICC as an 
institution, has power when it comes to “matters of enforcement of international humanitarian 
law”.413 However, the ICC may not always have jurisdiction, in cases occurred before the entry 
into force of the ICC Statute (1st of July 2002),414 as well as crimes committed outside the 
territory of any ICC member state nor committed by a national of the ICC state parties, 
consequently, states exercise jurisdiction over such IHL crimes.415 The ICC may only exercise 
jurisdiction on the basis of the principles of territory and nationality, consequently the ICC may 
not exercise jurisdiction based on the principle of passive personality.416A strong prima facie 
                                               
405 Crawford, 2012, p. 467. 
406 Higgins, 1994, pp. 56-57. 
407 Cooreman, 2017, p. 95. 
408 Ryngaert, 2015. 
409 Schabas, “National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes’”, JICJ 2003, Vol. 1, 
No. 1, pp. 39-63. 
410 Higgins, 1994. 
411 Cassese, 2008 and Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1984. 
412 Ryngaert, “Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era: A Role to Play for EU Member States with the Support of the 
European Union”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2006, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 51. 
413 Ibid., p. 51: “National courts of States Parties to the Rome Statute should accept that the ICC has henceforth 
the last word in matters of enforcement of international humanitarian law”. 
414 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998. 
415 Ryngaert, “Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era: A Role to Play for EU Member States with the Support of the 
European Union”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2006, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 78. 
416 Article 12, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998. 
Victoria Åkermarck 
 
 53 
case for exercise of universal jurisdiction by a particular state can be motivated when “a person 
suspected of having committed an international crime is found in the territory” of that state.417 
 
The principle of aut dedere aut judicare is present in various international treaties concerning 
international crimes,418 this principle contains the requirement of states to “prosecute the 
alleged offender who is present in their own territory” or if the perpetrator is not prosecuted, 
the perpetrator should be extradited.419 The mention of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare 
in international conventions and treaties confirms the international opinion that states 
themselves are enough equipped to address international crimes in an adequate manner, via 
universal jurisdiction, when and if the supposed offender can be found in the territory of a 
state.420 The principle of aut dedere aut judicare only applies to individuals and only when the 
perpetrator is present in the territory of the state that is exercising universal jurisdiction.421 
When it comes to the core crimes of human rights, universal jurisdiction can be applied 
according to CIL.422 Universal jurisdiction in absentia is nevertheless controversial and it might 
give rise to situations of conflict “as any State is entitled to assert its jurisdiction”.423 Hence, it 
is most times of no use for states to initiate investigations and prosecutions in absentia, 
                                               
417 Ryngaert, “Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era: A Role to Play for EU Member States with the Support of the 
European Union”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2006, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 52. 
418 Extract from Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of the four Geneva Conventions, 1949: ”Each High Contracting Party 
shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, 
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may 
also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to 
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie 
case”. Article 7, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
1984; Article 5 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
1973; Article 4 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; Article 5 of the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; Article 3 of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including 
Diplomatic Agents, 1973; and Article 5 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979 as 
well as Article 49 of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 1949; Article 50 of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949; Article 126 of the Convention relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, 1949; Article 146 of the Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, 1949; and Article 85(1) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977. 
419 Ryngaert, “Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era: A Role to Play for EU Member States with the Support of the 
European Union”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2006, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 52. 
420 Ibid., p. 53, see also p. 57. 
421 Ascensio, Extraterritoriality as an instrument, 2010, p. 3. 
422 Ibid., p. 3. 
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especially so, when strong evidence of an extradition of the alleged offender are lacking and an 
extradition seems nowhere being near even an eventual possibility.424 
 
3.3. Jurisdiction of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians  
3.3.1. Similarities and Differences of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians 
For the purpose of the subject of this thesis, that is, extraterritorial responsibility to protect 
civilians, this chapter examines the similarities and differences of R2P and POC, in order to 
distinguish where these two principles coincide. As mentioned in Chapter 2, R2P and POC 
contain several similarities and mutual purposes. The two norms of international protection 
overlap but are still separate principles.425 
 
In general, R2P is considered more controversial than POC, mainly because R2P is quite new 
a concept of international law compared to POC. Historically, POC as a concept is older than 
the principle of R2P, POC being codified and universalised already in the 1949 GCIV, whereas 
R2P as a concept was introduced in 2001.426 Additionally, military intervention causes debate 
and is often experienced as highly questionable.427 There is a close relationship between the 
two principles, both principles originate from the same moral of common humanity,428 and they 
both “share the same concern – civilian suffering from mass human-induced violence”.429 Both 
R2P and POC rely on international policy and both principles demand for intervention.430 Scope 
and applicability are, however, different for the two principles.431 The legal sources for R2P 
and POC share both similarities and differences. For R2P all four Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols are of relevance as the scope of R2P concerns the threat of war 
crimes, also war crimes in intra-state armed conflicts, whereas for POC it is specifically the 
                                               
424 Ibid., p. 56. 
425 See Popovski, “The Concepts of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians: ‘Sisters, but not Twins’”, 
Security Challenges 2011, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 1-12. 
426 See Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 and Report of the 
International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 2001. 
427 Breakey and Francis, “Points of Convergence and Divergence: Normative, Institutional and Operational 
Relationships between R2P and PoC”, Security Challenges 2011, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 41. 
428 Ibid., p. 41. 
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Security Challenges 2011, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 1. 
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GCIV which is of relevance.432 R2P covers ethnic cleansing and genocide, hence, international 
human rights law (IHRL) concerning non-discrimination of ethnic minorities and the 1948 
Genocide Convention are relevant for R2P.433 POC covers protection of children and therefore 
the CRC and IHRL regarding prohibition of recruitment of children in armed forces may be 
relevant for POC.434 
 
Where POC requires a situation of armed conflict, R2P can be yielded also in a situation that is 
not per se an armed conflict as both state failure or insurgency can be the situation at hand that 
yields R2P.435 In other words, R2P “centres not on war, but on atrocity”.436 Additionally, inter-
state armed conflict and intra-state armed conflict can yield R2P.437 Overall, POC can be 
interpreted as broader,438 to give an example, by including protecting civilians also in post-
conflict situations.439 R2P contains the state obligation to protect the people within a state’s 
jurisdiction against the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing. Therefore, when a state fails to protect its people from these crimes, the international 
community is to step in and protect. Situations of serious mass atrocities is when R2P is applied, 
hence R2P renounces from covering other human rights violations, not to mention suffering 
from natural disasters. When a state is deliberately unwilling to protect within its jurisdiction, 
ignoring the suffering caused by a natural disaster and in this way prolonging and increasing 
the suffering for its population, then application of R2P might be triggered.440 Nevertheless, 
within the frames of this example, of suffering initially caused by natural disaster and ignored 
                                               
432 Wounded and sick combatants (GCI); shipwrecked combatants (GCII); prisoners of war (GCIII); civilians and 
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433 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. 
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437 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001, Basic Principles A) and B); World Summit Outcome Document, 24 October 2005, UN doc. A/RES/60/1, 
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440 See Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect – Myanmar/Burma Briefing No. 2, Asia-Pacific Centre 
for the Responsibility to Protect, 2008. 
Victoria Åkermarck 
 
 56 
by the state and where there is a lack of evidence of a crime against humanity, application of 
R2P is out of reach and other mechanisms of humanitarian assistance are to be applied.441 
 
R2P is only applicable to situations of mass atrocity crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.442 Whereas POC can be applied to a spectrum of 
violations of human rights during armed conflict and to post-conflict situations. R2P can, thus, 
have a narrower scope of applicability than POC and preventive measures of R2P ought to be 
“specified to address particular atrocity crimes”.443 This, however, is subject to both debate and 
discussion as in other situations the scope of POC can be narrower than the scope of R2P. By 
way of example, the scope of POC is narrower than R2P when regarding war crimes; all war 
crimes are not committed against civilians and as such those war crimes not committed against 
civilians fall outside the scope of POC, but within the scope of R2P. R2P is applicable to all 
war crimes, whereas POC, is inapplicable to all war crimes. When a war crime is committed 
against anyone but a civilian, by way of example, prisoners of war, it would fall outside the 
applicability of POC but within the applicability of R2P. The scope of R2P is narrower than 
POC when regarding armed conflicts; R2P is applicable only in armed conflicts “in which mass 
atrocities have been systematically planned and committed” whereas POC is applicable to every 
armed conflict.444 
 
Crimes against humanity, when committed during armed conflict and war crimes committed 
against civilians fall within the scope of both R2P and POC.445 On the one hand, crimes against 
humanity or ethnic cleansing that is lacking any link to an armed conflict, falls outside the scope 
of POC but, within the scope of R2P. On the other hand, a situation which, for example, would 
engage R2P but not POC is when there is “protection of civilians threatened from escalating 
armed conflict” and neither mass atrocities are planned nor committed as part of that armed 
conflict.446  
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The two doctrines functioned as parallels when concerning the situation in Libya in 2011. The 
UNSC Resolution 1970, adopted on 26 February 2011, regarding Libya, established that the 
violations against the Libyan civilian population “may amount to crimes against humanity” and 
established the applicability of R2P.447 Then, when the sanctions imposed against Libya were 
unsuccessful in halting the violence against the civilian population, Resolution 1973 was passed 
by the UNSC and adopted on the 17 March 2011.448 The UNSC Resolution 1973 repeated the 
responsibility of Libya to protect its own population and it activated the POC.449 In this situation 
all three pillars of R2P were met; failure to protect its population by evidence of state-engaged 
activity in mass atrocities against its own population (Pillar 1), failure of measures by peaceful 
means to restrain additional violations against the civilian population (Pillar 2) and international 
preparedness to act via the UNSC and Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Pillar 3).450  
 
Large-scale, deliberate and systematic violations posed against civilians constitute the core 
concern of the R2P doctrine, as well as of the principle of POC. Practice has evinced that when 
there is a situation of immediate threat of atrocity crimes, then R2P is distinct as an initiative 
for direct military action as a last resort, whereas POC permits direct application of military 
action “against the military targets of the regime”.451 POC “requires a fundamentally integrated 
approach” where the relation between diplomacy, defence and development is different than 
the traditional one.452 
 
R2P and POC have a similar base for sharing of responsibilities. Both principles emphasise the 
same view on primary responsibility of the state; both principles accentuate that the sovereign 
state is the one with the primary responsibility to maintain and protect civilian life within the 
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jurisdiction.453 R2P consists of three pillars of protection whereas POC consists of four main 
forms or pillars, namely combatant POC, humanitarian POC, peacekeeping POC and Security 
Council POC.454 
 
3.3.2. Criteria for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
All exercise of jurisdiction that is not based on the principle of territoriality can then be stated 
to be extraterritorial jurisdiction.455 Extraterritorial jurisdiction can be interpreted as jurisdiction 
“not exclusively territorial”.456 However, the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction is confusing 
to some extent; the jurisdiction exercised is not fully extraterritorial as jurisdiction is asserted 
to courts of a given state which are found within a given territory.457 
 
To an increasing amount, jurisdiction is exercised extraterritorially, in cases when the subject 
in question so requires.458 The increased amount of exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction has 
not, however, diminished the controversies coupled with it.459 Each time unlawful acts occur 
abroad does not automatically mean application of domestic law by courts, even though courts 
possess the possibility to apply domestic law to the matter.460 Solid justification and a proper 
relation that connects the legitimate actual state of affairs with the jurisdiction that is to be 
applied are prerequisites for exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction according to Zalucki.461 
Two constituent components further need to be fulfilled for reasonable relation to be 
established: “a close relation between a state exercising jurisdiction (intending to do so) and the 
                                               
453 Sampford, “A Feuerbachian Inversion: From Sovereign Rights and Subjects Duties to Citizen Rights and 
State Duties”, Security Challenges 2011, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 52. 
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actual state of affairs it is to be applied to” and a clear interest carried out in good faith in order 
for the reasonable relation to be accepted by international law.462 When examining 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect, it can be difficult to argue for, or apply the reasonable 
relation, as the motive to protect is often perceived as universal or vague. 
 
Globalisation concerning banking and stock exchanges, technological development and the 
growth of multinational corporations as well as the ease of doing business across borders has 
led to both globalising crimes and globalising the counter-activity to reduce violations of 
international law.463 It might actually be questioned whether territoriality as a basis for 
jurisdiction would not be abandoned when faced to the complexity of global transactions.464 
Nevertheless, as Buxbaum has pointed out, other approaches placing other than the principle of 
territoriality at the centre, may likewise lead to international conflict.465 In the 21st century when 
the world itself is a global unity, where individuals can travel across borders without difficulty 
and companies and businesses function on a multinational basis, transnational criminal 
activities have consequently led to states exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction to an ever-
increasing amount.466 
 
Under the scheme of CIL, the principle of territoriality is regarded as the basic principle of 
jurisdiction.467 Nevertheless, national laws can be given extraterritorial application when those 
can be justified by one of the recognised principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction under PIL, 
namely: the principle of active personality, the principle of passive personality, the principle of 
protection or security and the principle of universal jurisdiction.468 When states wish to exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by application or enforcement of national laws extraterritorially, two 
main questions arise, when may and when should a state have the possibility to regulate acts 
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occurring outside its national territory and how should overlapping jurisdiction between two or 
more states be solved and settled.469 There are various bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under international law: territory, effects and nationality.470 Although, from a traditional point 
of view territoriality has been viewed as the primary basis for jurisdiction.471 There are, 
however, conflicts within the discourse of extraterritorial and territorial jurisdiction and hence 
the legal framework is differing and quite so state-bound, as the view on legislative jurisdiction, 
when discussing extraterritorial and territorial jurisdiction, is different from state to state.472 In 
general, it can be said that continental European states are more prone to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction than common law countries, as common law countries have a tendency to focus its’ 
emphasis on the principle of territoriality.473 The majority of continental European criminal 
codes are contributed by provisions of classical principles of criminal jurisdiction and include 
features of geographical provisions of the scope of application of domestic criminal laws.474 In 
general these criminal codes commonly state domestic criminal law to be applicable to all 
offenses committed within the territory of the state.475 Ratione loci scope of application of 
domestic laws attests to the important role of extraterritorial jurisdiction, that continental 
European states “have reserved for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction” by features of general 
provisions in their criminal codes.476 Whereas criminal codes in common law countries, do not 
feature introductory provisions on jurisdiction, thus only allowing extraterritorial jurisdiction 
for specific offences, which might “be explained by the high premium that these countries put 
on the territoriality principle”.477 Nevertheless, the practices of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
continental Europe and in common law countries has “witnessed a convergence of practises”.478 
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When it comes to extraterritorial jurisdictional links, there are varying examples. In its Cyprus 
v. Turkey479 and Loizidou v. Turkey480 judgements, the ECtHR consented that as Turkey 
exercised “effective control” of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,481 that is, 
an area outside the national territory of Turkey, the obligation set forth in Article 1 of the ECHR 
applied also to the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and that an extraterritorial 
jurisdictional link could be established based on the principle of territory.482 The ECtHR 
established that Turkey exercised effective control, and therefore borne the positive state 
obligation to prevent violations of human rights.483 In a similar way, in the case of Ilascu and 
Others v. Moldova and Russia the ECtHR found there to be an extraterritorial jurisdictional 
link between the Russian Federation and the territory of the Moldavian Republic of 
Transdniestria as Russian authorities provided military, economic and political support.484 
Consequently, the ECtHR concluded that the extraterritorial territory of the Moldavian 
Republic of Transdniestria was under the effective control of the Russian Federation and hence 
Russia was held responsible for the acts of violation.485 In Öcalan v. Turkey486 the ECtHR 
accepted that extraterritorial detention or arrest of a person by state agents, falls within the 
jurisdiction of that arresting state, as the person is set under the effective authority and control 
of that state via the arresting state agents.487 Thus, when the applicant was handed over to 
Turkish state officials, by Kenyan state officials, the applicant was under the effective authority 
of Turkey and thus within Turkish jurisdiction.488 ‘Effective control’ and ‘effective overall 
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control’ as interpreted in the Loizidou v. Turkey489 judgement are, thus, terminals for 
determining state jurisdiction over a territory.490 
 
In Issa and Others v. Turkey,491 the ECtHR further affirmed that extraterritorial military action 
does not necessary always constitute a link of extraterritorial jurisdiction.492 This case 
concerned a complaint of an “alleged unlawful arrest, detention, ill-treatment and subsequent 
killing” of seven Iraqi nationals during “a military operation conducted by the Turkish army in 
northern Iraq in April 1995”.493 The application was brought both on the own behalf of the 
applicants and on the behalf of the deceased relatives of the applicants.494 A state can be held 
accountable for violations conducted by its state agents operating outside the national territory, 
as the violated person is put under the authority and control of the violating state.495 In Issa and 
Others v. Turkey the ECtHR, though, held that “the applicants' relatives did not come within 
the jurisdiction of the respondent State within the meaning of Article 1” of the ECHR and hence 
the jurisdictional link was stated absent.496  
 
Under IHRL, extraterritoriality refers to constant respect of and protection of human rights, in 
all actions and everywhere not only within the territory but also outside the territory of a state 
and within the jurisdiction of the state.497 In an imagined situation, where a national of state A 
commits an act of crime aboard an aircraft registered in state B against a citizen of state C, all 
this when in the airspace of state D, all four states A, B, C and D may have jurisdiction.498 States 
A, B, C and D may have jurisdiction based on the principle of territoriality, the principle of 
active personality or nationality, or the principle of passive personality.499 Furthermore, if the 
crime is of an international character that gives rise to universal jurisdiction, then every state 
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can have jurisdiction over the subject, no matter the lack of a nexus with the crime.500 By way 
of example, in a world of global economy, economic law, devious business practices and 
fraudulent securities transactions may cause and produce effects that are worldwide, and 
thereby cause effects-based jurisdiction to be exercised by several states.501 When states act 
against the principles of human rights, violating its own population, then the international 
community also has a responsibility to protect the civilian population according to the principle 
of R2P. 
 
Jurisdiction is one of the most controversial subjects when regarding extraterritorial state duties, 
as it is crucial to determine who is entitled to exercise jurisdiction, i.e. which state is entitled to 
exercise its domestic jurisdiction.502 Often it is impossible to determine where domestic 
jurisdiction ends and where a foreign state’s jurisdiction commences, this adds to the 
controversy of the concept of jurisdiction.503 As seen in Chapter 3, regarding jurisdiction, 
territory has been seen as the primary base for jurisdiction, and to some extent, it still is. 
Whereas, when it comes to state obligations concerning human rights, the focus would need to 
be on jurisdiction as the control over persons suffering from foreign state activity, rather than 
on the narrow interpretation of jurisdiction as a synonym for territory.504 
 
Overall, one can say there are several bases for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, the 
principle of territoriality being the most traditional and the one the most often relied upon. The 
grounds for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction need to be grounded, either via a territorial 
link, nationality, or there needs to be a sufficient nexus and meaningful connection between the 
act conducted and the foundations for extraterritorial jurisdiction.505 According to Crawford the 
cardinal principle in determining which state has jurisdiction over a question, is about finding 
a genuine connection between the subject-matter of jurisdiction and the territorial base or 
reasonable interests of the state in question.506  
 
                                               
500 Ryngaert, 2015, p. 142. 
501 Ibid., p. 142. 
502 Skogly and Gibney, “Introduction” in Gibney and Skogly (eds.), 2010, p. 4. 
503 Ibid., p. 4. 
504 Ibid., p. 4. 
505 Cooreman, 2017, p. 91. 
506 Crawford, 2012, p. 457. 
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3.3.3. Respect of State Sovereignty and Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Sovereignty and jurisdiction walk side by side, jurisdiction by a state is entitled by its 
sovereignty.507 Under international law, the main actors are sovereign states, whereas uniform 
legal personality and sovereignty grant states to be equal in legal terms, under the law of 
nations,508 par in parem non habet imperium.509 States possess the highest power inside their 
territory, as states possess exclusive jurisdiction over both their territory and their population.510 
Human rights violations caused by objects subject to a foreign jurisdiction might cause conflict 
as extraterritorial exercise of national state jurisdiction nevertheless has effects on the local 
state. Often states refrain from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction as exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is perceived as intervention and in general, states are to avoid 
interfering in other states internal affairs.511 Extraterritorial intervention can cause worsened 
international relations and it is often perceived as lack of respect for sovereignty. Hence, one 
can say that “extraterritorial exercise of force inside another state infringes that state’s 
jurisdictional monopoly of force within its borders” by the concept of sovereignty,512 as 
sovereignty is most often interpreted as implying “a right against interference or intervention 
by any foreign (or international) power”.513 
 
According to the principle of non-intervention, states are prohibited from intervening in 
domestic affairs of other states.514 In order to intervene lawfully outside its own jurisdiction and 
on another states’ territory, a state needs to have the consent of that other state.515 There are, 
                                               
507 S.S. “Lotus”, Collection of Judgements, Permanent Court of International Justice (Series A. No. 10), 7 
September 1927, p. 19: “In these circumstances, all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the 
limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests 
in its sovereignty.” 
508 Cooreman, 2017, pp. 84-85. 
509 Higgins, 1994, pp. 78-79. 
510 Crawford, 2012, p. 456 and Cooreman, 2017, pp. 84-85. 
511 Article 2(4), Charter of the United Nations, 1945. 
512 Colangelo, ”What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, Cornell Law Review 2014, Vol. 99, No. 6, p. 1311. 
513 Jackson, “Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach To An Outdated Concept”, AJIL 2003, Vol. 97, No. 4, p. 
782. 
514 The principle of non-intervention was primarily developed in a military context: the principle restrained states 
from using force on the territory of another state. See the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA 
Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, UN doc. A/RES/2625 (A/8082), p. 123: “No State or group of States 
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any 
other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international 
law.” 
515 Crawford, 2012, p. 447: “In practice the sovereignty of most states is sullied by consent – e.g. the consent of 
UN member states that are not permanent members of the Security Council to be bound by the Council’s 
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however, questions where this exclusivity of jurisdiction owing to state sovereignty, is not 
granted to states. Treaty law renounces exclusive state jurisdiction, with the consent of states, 
whereas jus cogens norms renounces exclusive state jurisdiction without state consent.516 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is increasingly exercised, although, states tend to hesitate to exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The unwillingness to address extraterritorial issues could to some 
extent be seen as limiting the states exertion to protect human rights. In a situation where pillar 
three conditions of R2P are met, or in a situation of armed conflict and POC, then international 
intervention becomes an international responsibility. 
  
                                               
resolutions. The principle of consent has retained practical content more in some fields than in others, and more 
in certain formal settings – e.g. the jurisdiction of the ICJ […].” 
516 Crawford, 2012, pp. 448-449. 
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4. Extraterritorial Responsibility to Protect Civilians in a Situation of Armed 
Conflict 
4.1. Extraterritorial Protection of Human Rights 
4.1.1. Extraterritorial Application 
This chapter focuses on extraterritorial responsibility of states to protect civilians in a situation 
of armed conflict. The chapter will firstly discuss extraterritorial protection of civilians in 
general, together with a discussion on extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, state 
responsibility and effective overall control over territory. The chapter will conclude by 
analysing the extraterritorial responsibility to protect civilians in a situation of armed conflict. 
 
Extraterritorial state obligations are posed on states by international human rights treaties. 
International human rights treaties do, however, contain domestic state obligations.517 In the 
commentaries to the Draft articles on the Law of Treaties the ILC explained how the subject-
matter of a treaty is what demonstrates, if and how, rights and obligations apply territorially.518  
Human rights treaties apply to their state parties and therefore impose obligations to these.519 
Additionally, human rights treaties create obligations between the state parties and between 
states and individuals.520 Consequently, extraterritorial application of a human rights treaty to 
an individual comprehends and requires firstly that the state owe legal obligations to the 
individual under that treaty, and secondly, that at the time when the alleged violation is 
committed, the individual is physically located outside the territory of the state party 
concerned.521  
 
When determining the applicability of state obligations to a particular activity, the question of 
scope ratione materiae is addressed and whether the activity falls within this scope of the 
obligations concerned.522 Duties of a state, or state obligations, are triggered when a state has 
                                               
517 Skogly and Gibney, “Introduction” in Gibney and Skogly (eds.), 2010, p. 4. 
518 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1966, Vol. II, p. 213.  
519 Milanovic, 2011, p. 7. 
520 Ibid., p. 7. 
521 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
522 Wilde, “Triggering State Obligations Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in certain Human Rights Treaties”, 
Israel Law Review, 2007, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 503-526. 
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committed a breach of an international obligation, that is, an internationally wrongful act.523 
According to Nowak, “[u]nder contemporary human rights theory, all rights of human beings 
entail corresponding obligations of states to respect and ensure such rights”.524 The obligation 
to respect in this sense refers to the notion of states refraining from interference that is 
unjustified, the obligation to ensure then refers to positive obligations of states to protect and 
fulfil these rights.525 The obligation to protect refers to states avoiding human rights violations 
and the obligation to fulfil refers to states taking all necessary positive legislative, judicial and 
administrative measures to fulfil their state obligations and to ensure these rights are 
implemented.526  
 
The universal human rights of the UDHR have today become firmly established in legally 
binding conventions, namely in the human rights treaties of the UN.527 Similarly, states have 
largely committed to humanitarian conventions, as the Geneva Conventions and the Hague 
Conventions. Practice may not follow these human rights and humanitarian commitments, 
however, these commitments have been made.528 There are also regional instruments declaring 
respect of IHRL, like the ECHR,529 not to mention domestic law, where human rights are often 
incorporated by Bills of Rights in constitutions. While “advocating universal enjoyment of 
human rights, it does not make sense to limit the protection of human rights to national borders” 
and therefore these need to be protected not only territorially but also extraterritorially.530 The 
four Geneva Conventions share in their first Article the wording “in all circumstances”,531 
                                               
523 Skogly and Gibney, “Introduction” in Gibney and Skogly (eds.), 2010, p. 4. 
524 Nowak, “Obligations of States to Prevent and Prohibit Torture in an Extraterritorial Perspective” in Gibney and 
Skogly (eds.), 2010, p. 11. See also Nowak, 2003. 
525 Nowak, “Obligations of States to Prevent and Prohibit Torture in an Extraterritorial Perspective” in Gibney and 
Skogly (eds.), 2010, p. 11. 
526 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
527 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948; Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, 1951; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
1965; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1966; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979; 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984; Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 1989; Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families, 1990; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006; Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 2006. 
528 Milanovic, 2011, p. 231. 
529 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 
Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16, 1950. 
530 Skogly, “Extraterritoriality: universal human rights without universal obligations?” in Joseph and McBeth 
(eds.), 2011, p. 96. 
531 Article 1, GCI, GCII, GCIII, GCIV (Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
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meaning the articles of the four conventions are undertaken to be respected in any 
circumstances by the contracting parties. Consequently, it is a “cause-and-effect” kind of 
responsibility.532 The kind of “cause-and-effect” responsibility included in the Geneva 
Conventions, hence, applies also in an extraterritorial setting, as it allows for broad and 
extensive jurisdiction.533 By way of comparison, Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is broader 
than what Article 1 of the ECHR or Article 2 of the ICCPR are, as there is no jurisdictional 
clause in the four Geneva Conventions.534 Treaties comprehending IHL, have no jurisdictional 
clauses, as these treaties are to protect vulnerable people in situations of armed conflicts.535 
 
Similar state obligations as in Article 1 of the ECHR536 can be found in both the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)537 and in the 1981 African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR).538 In addition to the ECHR, the ACHR, the ACHPR and the ICCPR 
there are also other international human rights instruments, as the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the CAT,539 that through their case law 
share this view on application of extraterritorial jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances, that 
is, when a state is regarded as having effective control or authority over a territory540 or actions 
                                               
shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War), 1949. 
532 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, European Court of Human Rights  
(Application no. 52207/99), Grand Chamber Decision of 12 December 2001, paragraph 40. 
533Ibid., paragraph 40. 
534 See Chapter 3.2.3. in this thesis regarding jurisdictional clauses of the ECHR and the ICCPR. Article 1, GCI, 
GCII, GCIII, GCIV (Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War), 1949 and Article 1, European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supplemented by Protocols 
Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16, 1950. 
535 Milanovic, 2011, pp. 17-18. 
536 Article 1, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16, 1950. 
537 Article 1, American Convention on Human Rights,1969. 
538 Article 1, African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981. 
539 Article 1, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16, 1950; Article 1, American 
Convention on Human Rights, 1969; Article 1, African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981; Article 2, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; Article 2, International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 1966; and Article 2, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 1984. 
540 See Loizidou v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 15318/89), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment of 23 March 1995, paragraph 62; Loizidou v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights (Application 
no. 15318/89), Merits, Judgement of 18 December 1996, paragraph 52; Cyprus v. Turkey, European Court of 
Human Rights (Application no. 25781/94), Grand Chamber Judgement of 10 May 2001, paragraphs 75-77; 
Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, European Court of Human Rights  (Application 
no. 52207/99), Grand Chamber Decision of 12 December 2001, paragraphs 70 and 75; Legal Consequences of the 
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of non-state actors.541 Deprivation of life, by means of state power, in an area within the 
effective control of the state, equals to the fact that human rights treaties are applicable.542 In a 
situation of armed conflict, when a state has occupied a territory with the use of force, then IHL 
treaties apply simultaneously with IHRL treaties.543  
 
4.1.2. State Responsibility  
The ILC has concluded rules for state responsibility in its report on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.544 The articles of the ILC report are non-binding, however, they 
are seen as forming part of CIL. When a breach of a state’s international obligations can be 
attributed to a particular state, then international responsibility can be incurred on this state 
according to the ILC articles.545 Article 2 demonstrates the situations that constitute state 
responsibility and subparagraph 2(b) comprehends the interpretation of state jurisdiction in the 
                                               
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion 9 July 2004), ICJ Reports 2004, 
p. 136, paragraphs 107-113; Issa and Others v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights (Application no. 
31821/96), Judgement of 16 November 2004, paragraphs 69-70; and UN Human Rights Committee General 
Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (Art. 
2), 26 May 2004, UN doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, paragraph 10. 
541 X. against the Federal Republic of Germany, European Commission of Human Rights (Application No. 
1611/62), Plenary, Decision of 25 September 1965, p. 168; X. v. the United Kingdom, European Commission of 
Human Rights (Application No. 7547/76), Plenary, Decision of 15 December 1977, pp. 73-75; Delia Saldias de 
Lopez v. Uruguay (López Burgos v. Uruguay), United Nations Human Rights Committee, (Communication No. 
52/1979), CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, Views Adopted 29 July 1981, paragraph 12.3 and Individual opinion appended 
to the Committee's views at the request of Mr. Christian Tomuschat: “Never was it envisaged, however, to grant 
States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and 
personal integrity of their citizens living abroad.”; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgement of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14; M. v. Denmark, 
European Commission of Human Rights (Application No. 17392/90), Decision of 14 October 1992; The 
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995; Bankovic and Others 
v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, European Court of Human Rights  (Application no. 52207/99), Grand 
Chamber Decision of 12 December 2001, paragraph 75; Öcalan v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights 
(Application no. 46221/99), Judgement of 12 May 2005, paragraphs 13-60; UN Human Rights Committee General 
Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (Art. 
2), 26 May 2004, UN doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, paragraph 10; Article 16-18, Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001), Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission at its 
fifty-third session, UN doc. A/56/10; Wilde, “Triggering State Obligations Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in 
certain Human Rights Treaties”, Israel Law Review, 2007, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 503-526; and Costa da, The 
Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties, 2012, pp. 12-14, 93-110, and 255-273. 
542 Milanovic, 2011, p. 120. 
543 Ibid., p. 141. 
544 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session (23 April–1 June and 2 July–
10 August 2001), Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, UN doc. A/56/10. 
545 Article 2, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International 
Law Commission, 2001, UN doc. A/56/10. 
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sense it is seen in human rights treaties.546 The question this thesis aims to answer is, whether 
states have an obligation to extraterritorially protect human rights, as in protecting civilians 
extraterritorially, and how is it attributable to states to protect their nationals that suffer from 
human rights violations abroad. Jurisdiction and attribution are not tantamount to each other, 
even though both may give rise to state responsibility and both may be founded on the same 
circumstances.547  
 
Article 4 of the ILC report defines when conduct is considered an act of the state.548 Article 5 
further explains the significance of Article 4, by elucidating that conduct of a person or entity, 
which exercises governmental authority can also be considered an act of that state.549 Even 
though acts would not fulfil the criteria of Article 4, the acts could be considered acting under 
the effective control of that state. Article 8, still, indicates that acting under direction or control 
of a state, it is to be considered an act of the state and it can, hence, engage state responsibility.550 
An act of violation needs to be attributable to the state in order for state responsibility to be 
engaged for the state in question. Attribution can be tested through the concept of ‘effective 
control’. 
 
4.1.3. Effective Control 
Effective control as a measure of power or influence, will be defined and discussed in this sub-
chapter. Negative state obligations to respect human rights, have no territorial limitations, 
whereas positive state obligations to protect human rights is limited to situations of ‘effective 
control’. Effective control is defined as the total control over an area of territory. Milanovic has 
defined effective control in the following way: 
‘Effective control’ is also a homonym — there is the effective control test for the purposes of 
attribution, as developed by the ICJ in Nicaragua; there is ‘effective control’ as sometimes used in 
humanitarian law to describe the threshold of the beginning of a belligerent occupation of a territory; 
there is effective (overall) control of an area as a test developed by the European Court for the 
purpose of determining a state’s jurisdiction over territory; there is also effective control as used in 
international criminal law to describe the relationship a superior has to have over a subordinate so 
his command responsibility can be engaged.551 
                                               
546 Ibid., Article 2. Milanovic, 2011, p. 51. 
547 Milanovic, 2011, pp. 52-53. 
548 Article 4, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International 
Law Commission, 2001, UN doc. A/56/10. 
549 Ibid., Article 5. 
550 Ibid., Article 8. 
551 Milanovic, 2011, pp. 52-53. 
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As demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this thesis regarding jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the factual 
exercise of control and authority by a state. The right to exercise control and authority over a 
specific territory, in international law, is established by sovereignty or title. A state may well 
have sovereignty over a territory but not jurisdiction, which means that the state is lacking de 
facto control over the specific territory. 
 
Within the regional context of Europe, the ECtHR can hear complaints by individuals on 
violations of the ECHR. The ECtHR’s mandate originates in the ECHR. Cases that have caused 
debate regarding the extraterritorial application of the ECHR are among others Al-Skeini and 
Others v. The United Kingdom, Bankovic and Loizidou. In the Al-Skeini case, the United 
Kingdom breached its obligations under the ECHR as the United Kingdom failed to conduct 
effective investigation into the deaths of six Iraqi civilians that were killed by soldiers from the 
United Kingdom. The ECtHR found that the United Kingdom possessed obligations under 
Article 1 of the ECHR that applied in Iraq, as the United Kingdom could be seen as having 
effective control over the territory. Therefore, the United Kingdom possessed jurisdiction over 
the territory, and consequently borne human rights obligations towards the individuals within 
that said jurisdiction.552 According to Milanovic, the approach of the British court in the Al-
Skeini case was “unsatisfactory”, as there were no doubts that the killing of the six civilian 
Iraqis was attributable to the United Kingdom.553 Milanovic further stated this approach could 
be interpreted as imposing jurisdiction threshold on negative state obligation cases, where the 
negative state obligation  is to refrain from doing any harm.554  
 
By way of conclusion, it can be established that under international law, states can have 
extraterritorial responsibilities. Application of effective control tests is, however, limited as 
jurisprudence has demonstrated that extraterritorial effective control over territory or 
individuals is possible in situations of state exercise of military or administrative control over 
territory.555 
                                               
552 Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (Application no. 55721/07), 
Judgement of 7 July 2011. 
553 Milanovic, 2011, p. 51. 
554 Ibid., p. 51. 
555 See Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (Application no. 55721/07), 
Judgement of 7 July 2011, Loizidou v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights (Application No. 15318/89), 
Victoria Åkermarck 
 
 72 
 
4.2. Extraterritorial Responsibility to Protect Civilians under Foreign State Jurisdiction 
As seen previously in this thesis, the concept of R2P in itself, can to some degree be interpreted 
as an extraterritorial norm. The main thought of the concept of R2P is to ensure protection of 
civilians from atrocities, both by the national state, but where a state itself is unwilling or 
uncapable of protecting its own civilians, by the international community, that is to step in and 
provide protection.556 Similarly, POC is to a large extent an extraterritorial concept, as in most 
cases it would be most contradictory that the national state would both violate its civilian 
population, and simultaneously provide POC. 
 
The ideal situation with regard to extraterritorial protection of human rights, is that all states 
would within their jurisdiction protect human rights and also respect human rights everywhere, 
as a consequence the rights of civilians would not be violated anywhere.557 This, however, does 
not correspond to reality. All the same, where a state has de facto power over territory, it should 
avoid violating the rights of the individuals situated within the territory.558 When a civilian 
person then is situated within the jurisdiction of a foreign state, who is to protect this civilian 
in the occurrence of an armed conflict? As seen in this thesis, the R2P is an international norm 
of protection that primarily lies in the hands of the national state, and secondly on the 
international community.559 However, the concept of extraterritorial responsibility to protect 
civilians “challenges the traditional notions of jurisdiction, territory and state responsibility”.560 
In international law, state jurisdiction is based on territory, sovereignty and control.561 As seen 
in Chapter 3.2.2., jurisdiction can then be expressed through prescriptive, enforcement or 
judicial acts. The notion of territory is vital for sovereignty and jurisdiction, as territory is the 
                                               
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 23 March 1995, Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting 
States, European Court of Human Rights  (Application no. 52207/99), Grand Chamber Decision of 12 December 
2001. 
556 See Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect, 2001 and Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, 
UN doc. A/63/677. 
557 Roxstrom, Gibney and Einarsen, “The NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the Limits 
of Western Human Rights Protection”, Boston University International Law Journal 2005, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 73. 
558 Kamchibekova, “State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations”, Buffalo Human Rights 
Law Review 2007, Vol. 13, pp. 98-99. 
559 Report of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
2001 and Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 12 January 2009, UN doc. 
A/63/677. 
560 Kamchibekova, “State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations”, Buffalo Human Rights 
Law Review 2007, Vol. 13, pp. 87-88. 
561 See Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
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physical entity where the exercise of jurisdiction takes place. International human rights 
treaties, like the ECHR, the ICCPR and the CAT, can be applied also in situations of 
extraterritorial conduct.562 During an armed conflict, “human rights law continuously applies”, 
whereas some human rights need to “be interpreted in the light of the lex specialis” of IHL.563  
 
The state bears the primary responsibility to protect civilians within its territory and jurisdiction. 
This primary responsibility to protect civilians extends to all persons present in the territory; 
nationals, foreigners, visitors and so forth. In the occurrence of an armed conflict, this primary 
responsibility to protect of the state continuously exists. Effective control equals to 
extraterritorial application of jurisdiction,564 additionally, nationality and effect can equal to 
extraterritorial application of jurisdiction.565  
 
 
 
  
                                               
562 Article 1, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16, 1950, Article 2(1), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Articles 2, 5, 11, 12, 13 and 16, Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984. 
563 Kamchibekova, “State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations”, Buffalo Human Rights 
Law Review 2007, Vol. 13, p. 107 and UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 31: The Nature of 
the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (Art. 2), 26 May 2004, UN doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, paragraph 11: “As implied in General Comment 291, the Covenant applies also in 
situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect 
of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the 
purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”  
564 Milanovic, 2011, pp. 52-53. 
565 See Crawford, 2012, p. 458 and Ryngaert, 2015. 
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5. Conclusion  
This chapter concludes the findings of the research of this thesis regarding extraterritorial 
responsibility to protect civilians in a situation of armed conflict. The research of this thesis has 
aimed at providing answers to the research questions posed in the introductory chapter and has 
been carried out in the following manner. 
 
Firstly, R2P and POC has been discussed and analysed, providing for the detailed background 
and conceptual frameworks of these two norms of protection. R2P demonstrably has developed 
rapidly, from a conscientious concept to a universal political commitment to protect civilian 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, R2P is supported by the principle of international responsibility to 
protect. The primary R2P, however, lies at the national state, but where a state fails to provide 
protection from atrocities for its civilian population, then the international community has 
obligations to provide protection for these civilians violated by national state activity or foreign 
state activity. Pillar one R2P is anchored in IHRL and IHL as a legal norm, whereas the legal 
status of pillar two and three R2P is less evident, notwithstanding the fact that states are no 
longer allowed to stand by as passive observers when facing mass atrocity crimes. POC 
originates from IHL, although it to an increasing amount comprises much more than application 
of IHL. POC has become a policy commitment of the UNSC as well as of peacekeeping 
mandates and of humanitarian organisations. The two doctrines have become increasingly 
closer to each other since the beginning of the 21st century, as a consequence of support of R2P 
and the role of POC in peacekeeping mandates.566 R2P and POC share the same values of 
providing protection to civilians in the face of mass atrocity crimes and both principles share 
normative, operational and institutional standpoints, the two principles are not, however, 
synonyms.567 As demonstrated in this thesis, R2P and POC share similarities when regarding 
origin, evolution, scope of applicability, structure, legal basis and actors. These both norms of 
protection also initiate negative and positive state obligations. Both R2P and POC, are 
mandated to use of military force as a last resort, with the pronunciation focused on ‘as a last 
resort’, as R2P and POC in a pacific manner have the capacity to ensure protection from 
                                               
566 Smith, Whalan and Thomson, “The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Recent 
Developments”, Security Challenges 2011, Vol. 7, No. 4. 
567 Breakey and Francis, “Points of Convergence and Divergence: Normative, Institutional and Operational 
Relationships between R2P and PoC”, Security Challenges 2011, Vol. 7, No. 4. 
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humanitarian crises. Distinctive elements of R2P and POC are their applicability. R2P is 
applicable to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, whereas 
POC applies to any violation committed in a situation of armed conflict and even to post-
conflict situations. R2P is, thus, applicable irrespective of acts having been committed during 
an armed conflict or in times of peace. The two principles overlap and support each other, in 
providing protection to vulnerable populations. Both R2P and POC are primarily national 
within the jurisdiction of the territorial state. However, R2P and POC are simultaneously 
international responsibilities. 
 
Secondly, the jurisdictional foundation for extraterritorial R2P civilians has been demonstrated. 
There are multiple bases for jurisdiction, the principle of territory still being the principle the 
most often relied upon. The extraterritorial responsibility to protect civilians is founded on the 
humanitarian principle to protect the most vulnerable and on jurisdiction as responsibility, as 
states bear an obligation to ensure protection of human rights within their jurisdiction. Contrary 
to the principle of non-intervention, extraterritorial R2P and POC rely upon the universal 
commitment to protect and on the view that sovereignty equals to responsibility. The principle 
of non-intervention can be a prohibitive incentive on the R2P. 
 
Thirdly, through international human rights treaties, states have a constant obligation to protect. 
This obligation to protect includes extraterritorial protection, as states have an obligation to 
respect and secure human rights at all times, which has been interpreted to comply also to 
situations of extraterritoriality. Consequently, when a state is in a position of effective control 
over an area, that state has human rights obligations towards the civilian population in that 
specific area, be it nationals or non-nationals.  
 
Finally, this thesis takes the view that through IHL, IHRL and international treaties regarding 
protection of civilians in a situation of extraterritoriality, extraterritorial protection of civilians 
could be respected and afforded within the international community. Through the adoption of 
instruments of human rights and through the efficient translation from treaties into practice, 
extraterritorial rights of civilians could effectively be upheld and guaranteed to civilian 
populations during a situation of armed conflict. Generally, this thesis has aimed at uncovering 
the role of the state and the international community in the discussion regarding R2P and 
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protection of the civilian population by POC rights also for civilians that are under the 
jurisdiction of a foreign state. 
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